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ABSTRACT
Family firms are not only the most prevalent form of business organization in the world,
accounting for roughly 75% of all organizations (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Miller,
Steier, & Le Breton-Miller, 2003), they also represent “heterogeneous and complex enterprises” that offer
a “challenging array of issues to study” (Sharma, Chrisman, & Gersick, 2012, p. 5). Accordingly, this
series of essays explores diversification strategies in family firms by investigating the family specific
factors which may influence strategic decision-making. I begin with a review of the diversification
literature over the last 20 years. Next, using data from S&P 1500 firms, Essays 2 and 3 are quantitative
studies that focus on firm performance following acquisitions as well as ownership exit routes for family
owners. Specifically, in Essay 2, I focus on acquisition deals and investigate situations in which two
governance forms (family and non-family) interact within a single transaction. Lastly, in Essay 3 I
investigate the factors that may influence family business owners’ exit choice between an outright sale or
a gradual exit.
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ESSAY 1: A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY REVIEW OF DIVERSIFICATION IN FAMILY
FIRMS

1

INTRODUCTION
As family firms account for roughly one third to one half of all firms in the United States
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2008), understanding the key characteristics that
influence their diversification strategies is warranted. The most notable characteristics that
separate family firms from their non-family counterparts are: the owning family’s desire to
maintain control (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010), risk aversion due to wealth
concentration (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003), and safeguarding of the family’s socioemotional
wealth (SEW) (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007).
While a variety of research has examined how ownership affects diversification decisions (i.e.,
family firms vs. non-family firms), more recent work has shifted to focus on differences between
family firms by isolating conditions such as the institutional environment (Requejo, Reyes-Reina,
Sanchez-Bueno, & Suárez-González, 2018), CEO career horizons (Strike, Berrone, Sapp, &
Congiu, 2015), and the political connections of family management (Wang, Ma, Song, & Liu,
2016).
Despite the growth in this topic, contradictory results regarding diversification strategies in
family firms still exist in the literature. For example, as emphasized by Gómez-Mejía and
colleagues (2018), family firms are confronted with a dilemma; should they engage in
diversification (e.g., acquisitions) in hopes of achieving financial gains (Chatterjee, 1986), or
should they instead refrain from such activity to preserve the family’s SEW? The current research
surrounding family firm strategies has attempted to resolve this paradox by examining the
influence of domestic vs. international diversification strategies (Gómez-Mejía, Makri, & Kintana,
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2010), types of acquisition (Miller et al., 2010), the financial value of acquiring family firms
(Granata & Chirico, 2010), as well as exit strategies for the family (Chirico, Gómez-Mejia,
Hellerstedt, Withers & Nordqvist, 2019). While this work has provided a variety of insights, the
field still lacks an effective integration of the situations and circumstances influencing family
firms’ diversification strategies.
Therefore, the purpose of this article is to systematically review and analyze previous studies
on family firm diversification activity, as reviews are useful tools used to synthesize extant
knowledge, uncover relevant gaps in the literature, and further to promote growth in the field
(Short, 2009). For example, Haleblian and colleagues (2009) provide a multi-disciplinary review
examining the trends of M&A research and similarly, Worek (2017) offers a review which
highlights the implications of family governance forms on M&A activity. However, I argue that
an update is warranted to broaden beyond M&A research in order to capture all diversification
activities and to consider the motivations, (e.g., SEW), the types (e.g., FCB vs. FIF), as well as the
identity and involvement of the family in diversified firms, as these may serve as heterogenous
conditions (Melin & Nordqvist, 2007).
As such, I seek to extend family business research by reviewing studies on diversification
strategies within family firms by taking stock of the literature published between the years 19992019. Specifically, my search of 23 management journals over the last 20 years yields an initial 61
studies for review. my review begins by summarizing the theoretical assumptions and key
contributions made to the field. Then, within this work, I seek to reconcile the inconsistent findings
regarding family firm diversification activity. Furthermore, to synthesize and organize this area of
research, I offer an organizing framework which focuses on three key areas; (1) antecedents,
highlighting both family ownership and family involvement; (2) moderators, including areas such
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as the institutional environment, CEO characteristics, and organizational slack; and (3) outcomes
including areas related to family firm valuation, turnover, and related and unrelated diversification.
Through my discussion and framework of extant research I also reveal gaps for future work.
The objective of this paper is to systematically review, analyze, and extend the literature
surrounding diversification decisions in family firms. In doing so, I make three contributions to
the literature, first I attempt to reconcile contradictory findings by looking in-depth at the
definitions and criteria used to define family firms. Next, I examine contextual moderators of
diversification strategies to provide evidence of family firm heterogeneity, and third, I provide
areas for future research. Specifically, I offer guidance for future work to connect a variety of
research streams within the broader management domain. The remainder of the article proceeds as
follows, I begin by discussing my method for collecting the review sample and provide an
organizing framework to report my results. Next, I provide a brief review of the literature covering
diversification strategies within a family firm context, highlighting the key assumptions and
contributions made in the field since 1999. Lastly, I discuss my findings, limitations, and conclude
with areas for future research.

METHOD
The focus of this analysis is on one specific strategic decision, diversification, which is
defined as “the combination of business units from separate industries under the roof of one single
firm” (Schmid, Ampenberger, Kaserer, & Achleitner, 2015: 287) and follows several guidelines
to ensure a comprehensive review capturing the scope of family firm diversification literature.
First, the search covered the past 20 years of family firm diversification literature, spanning from
1999-2019. Second, the sample included in the literature review is limited to leading peer reviewed
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journals in the management, entrepreneurship, family business, and finance domains (Chrisman,
Chua, Kellermanns, Matherne, & Debicki, 2008; Fayolle & Wright, 2014). The list of 23 journals
includes: Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Administrative
Science Quarterly, Corporate Governance, Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, Family
Business Review, International Small Business Journal, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal
of Business Research, Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of
Family Business Management, Journal of Family Business Strategy, Journal of Finance, Journal
of Financial Economics, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Journal of
Small Business Management, Management Science, Organization Science, Small Business
Economics, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, and Strategic Management Journal.
The next step in the literature search included searching the title, abstracts, and keywords of
articles from 1999-2019 in the aforementioned journals for the following terms: diversification,
diversify, merge, merger, acquisition, acquire, mergers and acquisitions, and divest* (Haleblian,
Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; Wan, Hoskisson, Short & Yiu, 2011). Given
that the scope of this review is to examine work relating to diversification strategies in family
firms, the following terms relevant to family firm literature were also included: family firm, family
business, family enterprise, family control*, family influence, family involve*, and family own*
(Hiebl, 2013; López-Fernández, Serrano‐Bedia, & Pérez‐Pérez, 2016; Worek, 2017). The
aforementioned search criteria yielded an initial 61 articles which were then reviewed for relevance
and fit by examining each article independently. Corrigendums, erratums, commentaries (e.g.,
Combs, 2008) were removed, as well articles that were not relevant to the review topic. For
example, some articles were removed due to their focus on knowledge acquisition (e.g., CabreraSuárez, De Saá-Pérez, & García-Almeida, 2001; Duarte Alonso & Kok, 2018) or resource
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acquisitions (e.g., Blanco-Mazagatos, de Quevedo-Puente, & Castrillo, 2011), this resulted in final
sample of 39 articles included in the review (see Table 1 for a complete list of articles by journal).
===============================
Insert Essay 1 Table 1 about here
===============================

To understand how the research surrounding diversification in family firms has evolved over
the last 20 years, I plotted the published studies in the final sample by the year of publication (see
Figure 1 and Table 2). Both Figure 1 and Table 2 indicate that diversification research across all
fields was stagnant for a number of years until roughly 2007, where there is a consistent uptick in
publications in each subsequent year, with the highest levels of publication occurring in 2010 and
2011. This uptick of growth in the family firm diversification literature coincidentally aligns with
the introduction of the SEW perspective by Gómez-Mejía and colleagues in 2007, as this
theoretical lens provided scholars with an alternative explanation for the strategic decision making
within family firms. Additionally, Table 2 also reveals that the Journal of Family Business Strategy
was the largest contributor to publications in the sample with 8 publications, followed by Family
Business Review with 6 publications, respectively.
===============================
Insert Essay 1 Figure 1 about here
===============================

Given the multi-disciplinary approach of the review, I also plotted the published studies by
their respective discipline to identify how interest in each domain evolved (see Figure 2). Referring
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to Table 2, the entrepreneurship category represented: ETP, ISBJ, JSBM, SBE, and SEJ; family
business included: FBR, JFBM, and JFBS; the finance category comprised: JBF, JCF, JOF, and
JFE; lastly, the management discipline included: AMJ, AMR, ASQ, Corporate Governance, JBR,
JBV, JOM, JMS, MS, OS, and SMJ. Figure 2 reveals that the management field has contributed the
most, in the total number of publications, to the knowledge on family firm diversification. Whereas
research specific to family business journals has been a steady source of publications,
entrepreneurship journals have lagged in numbers of publications over the last 20 years.
===============================
Insert Essay 1 Table 2 about here
===============================
===============================
Insert Essay 1 Figure 2 about here
===============================

From the initial search of the articles, I further analyzed each individual article along multiple
dimensions. In this step, I coded for the type of article (e.g., empirical, conceptual, case study,
review, meta-analysis), topic area (e.g., M&A, divestment, diversification), country of sample,
theory(s) used, as well as, independent, dependent, and moderating variables. As a result of this
coding, a framework was developed to synthesize the literature and interpret the significant
findings produced over the last 20 years, which is summarized in Figure 3. This framework focuses
on three critical areas of diversification research: (1) the antecedents, or the factors that influence
diversification decisions; (2) moderators, including both internal (e.g., family CEO vs. non-family
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CEO) and external (e.g., institutional environment) factors that moderate diversification decisions;
and (3) diversification outcomes, including performance, valuation, and turnover, to name a few.
===============================
Insert Essay 1 Figure 3 about here
===============================

LITERATURE REVIEW
There are competing perspectives relative to a family firm’s disposition to engage in
diversification (Arregle, Duran, Hitt, & Van Essen, 2017). Traditional agency theory (Fama &
Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) assumes that strategic decisions are made only on the
basis of financial goals and therefore the agency perspective would suggest that family firms seek
to diversify over concerns related to firm performance. But this perspective ignores the potential
influence of non-financial goals on strategic decision making, which are highly prevalent in a
family firm setting (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). On
the other hand, family business research (e.g., SEW perspective) argues that family firms are less
likely to undertake diversification opportunities due to the fact that family firms are constrained
by family control and family ownership, as these both act as barriers to such strategies due to
concerns over the family’s preservation of control (i.e., transgenerational intentions, SEW
endowment) and further, the lack of experience and professionalism may be a barrier to
diversification performance or related outcomes (Arregle et al., 2017).
The resulting tension between agency theory and the SEW literature has resulted in a paradox
of whether family firms are more or less likely to engage in diversification based on their unique
ownership structure (Gómez-Mejía, Patel, & Zellweger, 2018). As extant work suggests, family
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firms’ overall diversification preferences are subject to two key characteristics; (1) the preservation
of the firm’s familiness (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Habberson & Williams, 1999) and (2) the
wealth family’s wealth concentration in a single organization (e.g., Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010;
Schulze et al., 2003; Zahra, 2005). Although the SEW perspective offers important insights into
the decision preferences of family firms, the diversification conclusions from empirical findings
remain mixed (Hussinger & Issah, 2019). As there may be issues with the assumption that family
firms operate under the same SEW goals or preferences (Gu, Lu, & Chung, 2019) or that SEW
preferences remain consistent over time or across generations (Nason, Mazzelli, & Carney, 2019).
Overall, the family business literature has concluded that there are stark differences between
firms managed by families and those owned by families (Schmid et al., 2015). Specifically,
through their sample of European family firms, Schmid et al. (2015) find that firms owned by
families have higher levels of diversification, but this is not true for firms managed by family
members. However, when examining family firms exclusively in the United States, other work
suggests that family firms are less likely to undertake diversification strategies (van Essen, Carney,
Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2015). Therefore, in the following section I examine both family
ownership and family involvement differences that have been extensively used in extant work and
which I argue may serve as the source of such contradicting conclusions.
The Dilemma of Defining Family Firms
The dynamics unique to family firm have been evidenced to impact business strategies
(Astrachan, 2010), as such, when researching family firms is it imperative to distinguish the
differential effects of ownership, control, and management (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). While there
have been a variety of definitions suggested (e.g. Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chua,
Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999), there is no concrete or universal definition used in the current family
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business or management literature to date (Schulze & Gedajlovic, 2010; Steiger, Duller, & Hiebl,
2015). This persistent lack of a uniform definition can lead to a large variation in family business
research (Chua et al., 1999) as the organizations, contexts, and influence may vary across family
firms and therefore may lead to conflicting findings (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella,
2007).
While reviewing the articles generated from the systematic search, it was critical to consider
how each publication defined their sample of family firms. Extant work has used ownership levels
as a necessary condition for definition while others have placed emphasis on the family’s
involvement in the company, or some combination of the two (Steiger et al., 2015). Typically, the
analyses included in this review included data from secondary sources (i.e., Hoover’s, company
websites, SEC proxy statements) and therefore adopt a loose definition of family firms (e.g.,
ownership at 5%) (see Table 3). While this lax definition of family firms is derived on the basis
of the family’s involvement in the company, whether controlled through shares, management,
and/or governance (Chrisman et al., 2005), it only represents the family’s potential to exert
influence, not evidence of the actual influence (Zellweger, Eddleston, & Kellermanns, 2010) and
therefore may not capture the real impact of the owning family. Regardless, the combination of
both ownership and involvement has emerged as a common method to identify family firms
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) and therefore, I use both criteria as the basis
for my antecedents in the following review section. Although the goal is this review is not to spur
a definitional dispute, some of the contradictory findings in the literature may stem from this
disparity. The question remains as to which family criteria (or both) under what circumstances has
the most influence on strategic decision-making. As such, in the following section of the review I
assess the particular influence both family ownership as well as family involvement on
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diversification strategies. Further, I evaluate the role contextual moderators (e.g., founder
characteristics, family CEO, etc.) may play in this research stream.
===============================
Insert Essay 1 Table 3 about here
===============================

ANTECEDENTS: WHY DO (DON’T) FAMILY FIRMS DIVERSIFY?
Family firms are generally risk averse concerning their diversification strategies (Anderson
& Reeb, 2003) and undiversified in their wealth position (Morck & Yeung, 2003), as a result,
scholars have focused their efforts to examine situations where family firms chose to engage in
diversification behaviors and why (e.g., Mickelson & Worley, 2003; Shim & Okamuro, 2011;
Worek, De Massis, Wright, & Veider, 2018). Such work has revealed a variety of antecedents
concerning diversification, which I categorize broadly into two areas: (1) the family presence, and
(2) the value of the firm. The family presence includes the interaction of ownership structure and
strategic behavior as well as the involvement of the family, which in family firms presents unique
outcomes (Ducassy & Prevot, 2010; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). Whereas the value of the
firm refers to the financial performance of the firm, as conditions of poor performance or periods
of success may render some diversification options more attractive than others.
Family Presence
Family Ownership. Early work regarding family firm diversification was scant (Steier,
Chrisman, & Chua, 2004), but as the field grew, contradictory evidence emerged from extant work
regarding the influence of family ownership on diversification (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003;
Defranq, Huyghebaert, & Luypaert, 2016; Miller et al., 2010;). As Ducassy and Prevot (2010: 224)
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suggest, “there is a distinctive problem associated with the family business on the question of the
relationship between ownership structure and the level of diversification” as such, a vast number
of past studies examine the influence of family ownership on diversification behavior.
If the founder and their family members are the only large shareholder, it would be expected
that these owners would subsequently have a very large influence over the firm’s strategic choices
through their ownership and management presence (Schmid et al., 2015). These family owners are
likely to forgo diversification in order to preserve the family’s SEW as well as their financial
wealth (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008). However, this is not the case if there is another large
(non-family) shareholder that may be able to exert influence over the decision making of the firm.
These non-family shareholders are likely to have less risk aversion and therefore they may wish to
diversify their portfolio. As recent work has considered the role of the second largest shareholder,
for example, Sánchez-Bueno and Usero (2014) discern whether the second largest investor is a
financial institution or another family firm and what effect these groups have on international
diversification. They argue that there is more heterogeneity to be understood from diversification
decisions by examining not only the family as the primary shareholder but also look to the second
largest shareholder as a key source of influence.
At low levels of family ownership (i.e., non-majority levels) family firms prefer acquisitions
targets that are related to their current industry. However, as the level of family ownership
increases, family firms are more inclined to pursue an industry diversifying strategy. Defrancq et
al. (2016) attribute this finding to the owning family’s desire to lower the overall risk for their
firm, as a diversifying M&A strategy would allow the dominant family owners to alter the profile
of their investments. Similarly, Miller et al. (2010) agree that diversified acquisitions allow family
firms to expand their portfolio of wealth and therefore serves as a mechanism through which family

12

firms can lessen their overall risk. But as the level of family ownership increases, the propensity
to engage in international diversification decreases (Sánchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014).
Compared to non-family firms, family firms are less likely to merge (Shim & Okamuro,
2011), but when ownership levels exceed 90%, the preferences shift to mirror those shared by nonfamily firms (i.e., more willing to merge). Contrary to this finding, Chirico et al. (2019) suggest
that mergers, while not always the most financially lucrative option, is preferred by family firms
as this strategy allows the family to maintain their SEW endowment through the continuation of
the business. Whereas non-family firms are more likely to prioritize financial returns are thus are
more likely to exit through a sale or dissolution.
Overall, the popularity of family ownership in diversification studies is well established, as
the owning family is likely to have a significant influence on strategic decision making. But in
addition to ownership, researchers also often use levels of family involvement to characterize
family firms. Recent work has even suggested that together, ownership and management may
counterbalance each other (Schmid et al., 2015). Therefore, the next section of my review focuses
on the antecedents used in the literature to examine the influence of family involvement on
diversification strategies.
Level of family involvement. The previous discussion highlights the importance of the
definitions used to characterize family-controlled firms. Often scholars also include levels of
family involvement as a necessary condition for family firms (Chrisman et al., 2012). For instance,
Granata and Chirico (2010) use a 51% ownership threshold but also require that firms in their
sample additionally have at least two family managers involved in the business. Although other
scholars have used smaller ownership levels (i.e., greater than or equal to 5%), this is often
accompanied by requirements of family involvement (e.g., Basu, Dimitrova, & Paeglis, 2009;
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Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Defrancq et al., 2016; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018; Miller et al.,
2010; Strike et al., 2015).
Early work in family firm research focused on the basic delimitation between family and
non-family firms, but in line with recent literature, there is evidence that variance exists among
family firms (De Massis, Kotlar, Mazzola, Minola, & Sciascia, 2018) signaling the recent
popularity of arguments surrounding heterogeneity in the family firm literature (e.g., Chua,
Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012; Memili & Dibrell, 2019; Nason et al., 2019). The requirement of
family involvement in either a management position or a seat on board of directors reflects how
the role the family ownership structure may influence strategic decision making (Defrancq et al.,
2016; Schmid et al., 2015). Whereby the involvement influences major decisions and extant work
suggests that family members display a preference for synergistic diversification (Jain & Shao,
2014) that preserves their personal SEW endowment by safeguarding the survivability of the
business. Not only are the strategic decisions in family firms influenced by the involvement of
family members but the profitability of such decisions may also be impacted (Caprio, Croci, &
Del Giudice, 2011). If family firms are monitored by family members, they may be motivated to
avoid poor-performing takeovers or risky investments given that they are the most risk averse
group of shareholders (Caprio et al., 2011; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018; Schmid et al., 2015).
Firm Characteristics
Performance above/below aspiration levels. Family business scholars have recently
focused attention on the role of past performance in diversification strategies, proposing that
financial distress or performance below aspiration levels may significantly influence the point of
reference concerning diversification options, growth strategies, or exit preferences. For example,
using a mixed-gamble perspective, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2018) argue that family firms differ from
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non-family firms because they face two competing decision dimensions, financial utility and SEW.
Given the uniqueness of the SEW endowment that family firms hold, their acquisition likelihood
is largely dependent on their current level of performance (i.e., performance above or below
aspiration levels). Similarly, Hussinger and Issah (2019) consider performance levels when
examining related and unrelated acquisition decisions, arguing that the long-term orientation of
family firms renders related acquisitions more favorable than unrelated targets.
Additionally, when performance is below aspiration levels, there is a threat to both the
longevity of the firm as well as to the socioemotional endowment of the family. If the survivability
of the firm is in question, this would suggest that families are faced with a total loss of both
financial and nonfinancial priorities. Therefore, family firms may forgo their SEW concerns and
instead pursue strategies aimed at keeping the firm afloat. However, when performance is good
(i.e., above aspiration levels), there is no incentive for family firms to endanger their SEW and
therefore they behave in a risk averse manner. Thus, current performance serves as an important
antecedent to diversification decisions in family firms.
Through their work on exit strategies, Chirico and colleagues (2019) suggest that
performance below aspiration levels is critical in understanding the different exit strategies
undertaken by family firms versus non-family firms. They find that under poor performance
conditions, family firms are more likely to exit via merger, as this options salvages SEW for the
family whereas non-family firms are more likely to exit via sale or dissolution as this option offers
higher financial returns. This provides evidence that performance heuristics, in addition to family
ownership, serve as a considerable influence on decision making (Chirico et al., 2019).

MODERATORS
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Although much of the extant work on diversification research evaluates family firms to nonfamily firms (i.e., Feldman, Amit, & Villalonga, 2016, Feldman, Amit, & Villalonga, 2019;
Granata & Chirico, 2010; Jain & Shao, 2011), scholars have also assessed specific contextual
variables surrounding diversification decisions to develop a stronger understanding of the
diversification to performance relationship (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Defrancq et al., 2016;
Miller et al., 2010). In the following sections, these conditions are organized into three levels of
analysis: family (e.g., CEO, founder), firm (e.g., levels of slack and political connections), and
environmental characteristics (e.g., legal system and institutional environments).
Family Characteristics
Founders. Distinguishing shareholders between founding family members and private
shareholders is a critical distinction in family firm research (Miller et al., 2007; Villalonga & Amit,
2010). These differences are pronounced as founding families generally exhibit greater
commitment and a stronger emotional connection to the business (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia,
2012; Schmid et al., 2015). Further, as some (e.g., Cannella, Jones, & Withers, 2015; Praet 2013;
Villalonga & Amit 2006) have argued, there may be additional differences between firms with a
founder presence versus firms where only descendants of the founding family are present.
Through their study on German family firms, Schmid and colleagues (2015) separate the
effects of founders and non-founders on diversification strategies. Looking specifically to the
active participation of founders, they find that founder ownership does not lead to higher
diversification levels. However, founder presence on the management board does influence
diversification, as they found that family firms with founders serving on the board of directors are
typically less diversified. Overall, their results conclude that risk aversion is greater in later
generation family firms compared to family firms where the founder is still active. This view is
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attributed to the founder’s willingness to take risks during the start-up or IPO phase, whereas
family descendants may not be willing (or required) to take such large risks (Schmid et al., 2015).
By examining divestment strategies, Praet (2013) argues that founders are not concerned
with nonfinancial objectives, thus resulting in higher levels of divestment activity. Praet (2013)
concludes that founders act as superior monitors of the firm and are therefore more willing to
divest of subsidiaries to increase performance than other later generation family firms. These
arguments may be more in line with the results of Villalonga and Amit (2006), who suggest that
founders create value while heirs destroy value.
Family vs. non-family CEO. The presence of a family CEO has also been shown to
demonstrate a strong influence on diversification decisions and subsequent performance
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). For example, Tsai, Kuo, and Hung (2009) suggest that compared to
non-family members, family CEOs are more concerned with preserving the prestige and wealth of
the firm and therefore have more incentive to reduce risky behaviors. Further, Bauguess and
Stegemoller (2008) hold a divergent view that family firms destroy value through acquisitions due
the entrenchment through family control. Whereas Caprio et al. (2011) argue that heir CEOs may
not adhere to money hungry stereotype of corporate CEOs but instead are risk averse towards
acquisitions.
While there is opportunity for family CEOs to behave in a self-serving manner and extract
benefits from the firm, Caprio et al. (2011) conclude that family CEOs typically do not engage in
takeovers as means to exploit their position. Rather, family CEOs (heirs not founder) behave in a
restrained manner regarding acquisitions, suggesting that the family serves as a tight monitor of
acquisition strategies (Caprio et al., 2011). Therefore, CEOs in family firms may not be able to use
diversification strategies as means for promoting their own agenda (De Cesari, Gonenc, & Ozkan,
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2016). Despite this reluctance towards acquisitions (Steen & Welch, 2006), when family do
acquire other firms, the shareholder returns are greatest when a family CEO is at the helm buying
a business from a non-family divestor (Feldman et al., 2019).
From a SEW perspective, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2010) argue that SEW is the most salient
factor regarding diversification and as such, family firms structure CEO incentives as protection
against diversification decisions. Further, Strike et al. (2015) examine the influence of career
horizons on family CEOs acquisition strategies, finding that when family CEOs are closer to
retirement, they acquire targets that are larger and culturally similar. Attributed to the fact that as
retirement looms larger, the goal for control decreases and the concern for succession increases.
Therefore, family CEOs may view diversification as means for growth for future generations as it
may allow more room for future generations to have a position in the organization.
Lastly, when examining divestments, Feldman et al. (2016), argue that family firms are
strongly against such strategies as they eradicate the nonfinancial objectives for the family (i.e.,
preserving legacy, family social status, family harmony, employing family members). Given the
proclivity against divestitures, the financial value generated from these deals must be higher for
family firms than non-family firms, in order for a family to engage. Specifically, Feldman et al.
(2016) argue that the deal value will be greatest for family firms with either a founder or family
CEO, as they are most strongly connected to the firm. Contrary to the findings of Feldman et al.
(2016), Praet (2013) finds that the presence of a family CEO has no impact on the divestment
decision but alternatively argues that founders have a larger role.
Firm Characteristics
Levels of slack. The availably of slack resources may afford family firms the ability to family
firms to pursue noneconomic goals related to SEW, as slack acts as a buffer against inferior
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performance (Bourgeois, 1981; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018). However, preserving organizational
slack may only be suitable in times of economic prosperity but may be difficult to maintain during
downturns (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005). Suggesting that the slack is a component of the firm’s
overall risk-bearing, levels of financial slack may also influence the likelihood that a family sells
their firm (Worek, 2017) as well as the overall survivability of the firm (Bradley, Shepherd, &
Wiklund, 2011; Chirico et al., 2019).
When evaluating the effect of slack resources on acquisition activity, extant work suggest
that higher levels of slack will decrease the likelihood that family firms will pursue acquisitions
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018). Whereas other literature would suggest that slack resources render
acquisitions more likely (e.g., Levinthal & March, 1981), Gómez-Mejía et al. (2018) argue that
slack combined with the family control counteract this traditional view in the literature. Further,
bountiful slack resources indicate a strong financial position and therefore give the family room to
emphasize their noneconomic goals. Additionally, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2018) find that slack
resources not only influence acquisition propensity but also influence the type of target (e.g.,
related vs. unrelated) a family firm will acquire. They argue that higher levels of slack provide
more security in the activities of the focal firm whereas low levels of slack make the family firm
more vulnerable (i.e., likely to acquire an unrelated target).
Diversification experience. While the majority of literature regarding family firms’
motivation to pursue diversification would suggest that family firms are risk averse due to their
wealth concentration, broad management literature on the other hand regarding acquisitions
suggests that previous experience is positively related to acquisition likelihood (Haleblian, Kim,
& Rajagopalan, 2006). Specifically, the more often a firm completes an acquisition transaction,
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there is some learning associated and thus the likelihood of subsequent transactions increases
(Barkema & Schijven, 2008).
Through a social capital lens, Jones, Makri, and Gomez-Mejia (2008) argue that affiliate
directors will positively influence the diversification decisions in family firms. These affiliate
directors are argued to have a more active role than independent directors as well as stronger
relational link with the family in order to reduce the risk associated with diversification decisions.
Further, the inclusion of this group of directors enables the family firm to pursue growth strategies
because of the knowledge, experience, and networks the affiliate directors offer.
Political connections. Political connections provide many benefits to organizations, both
family and non-family (Ge, Carney, & Kellermanns, 2019). Within family firms, research has
examined how these ties may aid in overcoming the second-generation demise (Xu, Yuan, Jiang,
& Chang, 2015) as well as counteracting institutional voids (Ge et al., 2019). Specifically,
regarding diversification strategies, political connections have been examined as an influence of
business transformation, concluding that family firms with strong political connections are more
likely to use M&A strategies to enter new industries (Wang, Ma, Song, & Liu, 2016). Further, the
presence of political connections increases the likelihood that family firms will enter governmentregulated industries (Wang et al., 2016).
Environmental Characteristics
Scholars have argued an issue with diversification literature is that a majority of the research
is based on data from firms in the United States and ignores the differences that other institutional
environments may present (La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). In order to answer this
gap recent work has expanded outside the United States to explore contexts like emerging
economies (e.g., Chung & Luo, 2008; Lien & Li, 2013), varying legal systems (e.g., Requejo et
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al., 2018), and institutional norms (e.g., Ducassy & Prevot, 2010). These efforts are reviewed
below under two environmental characteristics, legal systems and institutional norms.
Legal system. Varying across the world, legal systems are important influences on strategic
decision making (La Porta et al., 1999). Given the relevance of heterogeneity arguments in the
family business literature (Memili & Dibrell, 2019; Nason et al., 2019), legal systems are
considered yet another source on which family firms may differ (Requejo et al., 2018). Extant
work has demonstrated that family firm behavior is dependent on both the level of family
involvement as well as the legal system in which the firm operates (e.g., Berrone et al., 2012;
Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; Nordqvist, Sharma, & Chirico, 2014; Peng, Sun, Vlas,
Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2018; Requejo et al., 2018). For instance, when considering the acquisition
likelihood of family firms, countries with stronger legal systems have been found to increase the
likelihood that family firms will engage in acquisitions (Requejo et al., 2018). Extant work
regarding acquisition propensity in family firms has concluded that family firms are more risk
averse due to SEW concerns and therefore often forgo acquisitions but as Requejo et al. (2018)
show, this assumption may be limited to particular legal environments. Further, the legal
environment has been illustrated to influence the valuation in merger and acquisition transactions
(Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010), as weaker legal environments in the target country has
a positive influence on shareholder valuation in the focal firm.
The structure of legal systems also alludes to the protection offered to shareholders. For
example, France as a civil law country, offers very little protection for minority shareholders
(Ducassy & Prevot, 2010; La Porta et al., 1999). As in most Western European Countries, family
ownership is typically concentrated with many family shareholders present in the firm (Faccio &
Lang, 2002), suggesting the family firm is likely to act in the interest of the family with little regard
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to other shareholders. Additionally, the variation across countries may explain why the
discrepancy in findings as the SEW perspective may be more predictive in different institutional
or legal settings (Berrone et al., 2012; Peng et al., 2018; Requejo et al., 2018).
Institutional norms/institutional environment. Institutional environments such as
emerging economies offer a unique context for research as these environments are often filled
family-controlled firms (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Filatotchev, Lien, & Piesse, 2005).
These family firms tend to be highly diversified conglomerates (Lien & Li, 2013; Yiu, Bruton, &
Lu, 2005) given that diversification strategies have been shown to supplement the limitations of
this particular institutional environment (Bergh & Lawless, 1998). Further, the governance
structure and goals of family-controlled firms differ across institutional environments (Bae, Kang,
& Kim, 2002; Daspit, Chrisman, Sharma, Pearson, & Mahto, 2018) and may be more prolific in
emerging economies (Worek, 2017).
Dominant families may have differing institutional norms in different environments thus
serving as basis of heterogeneity of business strategies (Chung & Luo, 2008). For instance, Lien
and Li (2013) find that diversification strategies are used by family-controlled firms in emerging
economies in order to entrench corporate control so to safeguard the firm for future generations.
Suggesting that institutional environments are a relevant factor when considering the strategies
adopted by family-controlled firms. Additionally, Chung and Luo (2008) examine business group
restructuring in emerging economies using a sample of family-controlled business groups from
Taiwan. They argue that the institutional logics perspective, represented by the corporate
governance model, may explain why family-controlled business groups differ in their acquisition
and divestiture strategies. Their findings suggest that the institutional norm of equal inheritance
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may prevent family-controlled firms from engaging in unrelated acquisitions as this may shirk
value from other shareholders.
Given that different legal systems and institutional environments exert different influences
on family firms (La Porta et al., 1999), produces conflicting conclusions in the family business
literature across the different environments. For example, Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) find
a negative value of acquisitions in family firms based on their study of publicly traded US firms,
whereas Caprio and colleagues (2011) find that this is not true in Continental Europe, and attribute
this opposite effect to the different institutional differences and that Europe serves as a more
conducive legal environment for family firms to flourish.

DIVERSIFICATION OUTCOMES
Diversification likelihood or diversification activity is a common outcome evaluated the
family firm diversification literature. However, there are also a subset of studies that examined
additional outcomes associated with diversification strategies. Therefore, in the following section
I highlight the variety of diversification outcomes in four areas: performance, internationalization,
turnover, and related and unrelated diversification.
Outcome Variables Used in the Literature
Performance. Given that family firms are less diversified than non-family firms (van Essen
et al., 2015) which may help the overall performance of family firms, as diversification has a
tendency to impair performance. However, there have been competing results produced in the
diversification literature regarding valuation of family firms with regards to particular
diversification strategies. Regarding acquisitions, Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008), in line with
agency theory, find evidence that family firms lose value with such strategies. Yet on the other
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hand, Feito-Ruiz, and Menéndez-Requejo (2010) reveal that family ownership has a positive
influence on shareholder valuation following acquisitions, with the caveat that this positive effect
is mitigated once ownership exceeds a 32% threshold. Additionally, when examining diversifying
M&As, Defrancq and colleagues (2016) find that on average, industry diversifying M&As yield
lower returns, however this negative effect is reversed when families serve as the majority
shareholder and as such does not destroy shareholder value.
While some management research has concluded that family firms outperform non-family
firms (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008), other work has
suggested that family firms are seen as inefficient firms and therefore have a lower valuation than
non-family firms. Specifically, when family firms are the target firm in an acquisition, they are
acquired at a discount relative to the price paid for non-family firms (Granata & Chirico, 2010).
Scholars attribute this price disparity to the fact that family owners are likely to attach a noneconomic (e.g., SEW) element to the firm value, leading to the overpricing or overvaluing of the
firm (Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008; Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012). But this
(over)valuation does not hold up in the market, as buyers may search for similar non-family firms
that do not carry a SEW price premium (Chirico et al., 2019; Feldman et al., 2016).
The conclusions regarding performance post-merger are rather decisive. On the outset,
family firms are less likely to merge than non-family firms due to concerns over control (Shim &
Okamuro, 2011) and concerns over complex family dynamics (Mickelson & Worley, 2003). Yet
when the long-term survivability of the family firm is jeopardized, family firms are more likely to
view mergers as an appropriate exit strategy (Chirico et al., 2019) in order to salvage noneconomic
value attached to the business. However, when a family firm does engage in a merger it is expected
that the gains realized from the transaction must compensate for the loss in control, however, on
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average, family firms experience lower performance from mergers than non-family firms (Shim
& Okamuro, 2011).
Internationalization. As the amount of family control increases so does the reluctance for
family firms to engage in international diversification (Sánchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014). This
hesitation is centered around arguments concerning the owning family’s desire to protect or
maintain their SEW endowment through the pursuit noneconomic goals (Chrisman et al., 2012;
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). “The negative effect of the level of family ownership has on
international diversification underscores the significance of non-economic goals in family
businesses” (Sánchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014: 1319).
The diversification literature has also concluded that family firms prefer similar (i.e.,
culturally close) targets rather than international diversification due to the concerns over
managerial motives (Chen, Huang, & Chen, 2009) and as this strategy lessens the threat to the
family’s SEW (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010). When going international is an option, family firms
will focus on the culturally close targets because this may be an easier transition given the general
lack of diversification experience. Cultural distance in this sense represents the differences in the
managerial values, mind-sets, and norms (Hofstede, 1984). Therefore, culturally close targets may
allow for more synergies across both firms and pose less of a threat to the SEW for the owning
family (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010) since this would reduce the information asymmetries and limit
the conflicts.
Yet, other scholars caution that these preferences may differ under certain circumstances. As
previously mentioned, Strike et al. (2015) explore the influence of CEO career horizons on
acquisition strategies, finding that as CEOs get closer to retirement, they become more willing to
undertake international acquisitions, despite the short-term risks. Strike et al. (2015) attribute this
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willingness to the shifting reference point, that near retirement CEOs become more concerned
about future generations and therefore are willing to pursue growth strategies to ensure the longterm survivability of the firm and acquisition transactions are just one means for this goal.
Other work regarding diversification highlights the importance of the second largest
shareholder in international diversification decisions. Specially, Sánchez-Bueno and Usero (2014)
find in family firms when the second largest shareholder is another family, the likelihood of
diversifying remains low. Implying that the goals of both families may be aligned towards
noneconomic goals and the preservation of SEW for both families (Berrone et al., 2012; Memili,
Chrisman, & Chua, 2011; Sánchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014). However, when the second largest
shareholder is a financial institution, Sánchez-Bueno and Usero (2014) find a positive influence
on international diversification. Suggesting that these financial institutions may inform family
owners of international opportunities and also may help to reduce information asymmetries
regarding foreign entry.
Turnover. A significant area of management research has focused on the relationship
between top executives and diversification (e.g., Cannella & Hambrick, 1993; Kroll, Wight,
Toombs, & Leavell, 1997; Krug, Wright, & Kroll, 2014). However, few studies have examined
this relationship in a family business context despite the premise that the owning family may
significantly influence this process (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). While
CEOs in non-family firms have the ability to use acquisition strategies to reduce the likelihood of
replacement, CEOs in family-firm may not have the ability to pursue acquisitions due to the
interests of the controlling family (De Cesari et al., 2016). Further, family firms are more likely to
avoid creating CEO incentives that promote diversification strategies due to their concerns over
maintaining family control. For instance, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2010) conclude that family firms

26

are more risk averse than their non-family counterparts and therefore structure CEO incentive pay
in a way that discourages diversification, especially international diversification.
Through their study of CEO turnover in family and non-family firms, De Cesari and
colleagues (2016) find that following an acquisition, CEOs in family firms are not likely to be
dismissed from the company. Similarly, Tsai et al. (2009) find that even under conditions of poor
performance, the family control may deter turnover for CEOs. Which may suggest that while
family firms are generally against diversification strategies, CEOs need not fear the threat of
termination if they decide to engage in an acquisition.
Diversification: related & unrelated. The literature is split between whether family firms
are more likely to diversify in related or unrelated areas of business. On one hand, family firms do
not favor diversifying mergers or acquisitions due to their SEW and noneconomic perspectives
causing them to be risk averse (Chung & Luo, 2008; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018; Gu et al., 2019).
From the SEW lens, Gómez-Mejía et al. (2018) posit that undiversified acquisitions are subject to
uncertain future performance and further, an unrelated acquisition may deplete SEW for the family
principals in the firm. Similarly, Defrancq et al. (2016) isolate the differences between lone
founder and family firms and observe that family firms are the most cautious and are least likely
to take over an unrelated firm. Therefore, when family firms do acquire, they prefer related targets,
as this reconciles both financial as well as SEW concerns. Alternatively, from an agency
perspective, Miller and colleagues (2010) argue diversification is one avenue through which family
firms can reduce business risk associated with their undiversified portfolio and as such, they find
that the likelihood of diversifying acquisition increases with the level of family ownership.
Likewise, Ducassy and Prevot (2010: 224) in their study of French companies, show “that there is
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no difference between family and non-family businesses in terms of the choice of diversification
type (related or unrelated).”
These differences in the unrelated and related diversification findings may be attributable to
differing generations or the varying levels of ownership used in each sample. For instance,
Ducassy and Prevot (2010) define a family firm as a one with family members involved in
management that is beyond the first generation (see Table 3). While Miller et al. (2010) adopt a
5% ownership threshold in addition to requiring family involvement in either the management
team or board of directors. As recent literature has proposed, SEW and risk preferences may differ
between generations (Chua et al., 2015; Gu et al., 2019; Nason et al., 2019). Further, Ducassy and
Prevot (2010) exclusively use a French sample of corporations and Miller et al. (2010) and GómezMejía et al. (2018) rely on samples from the Fortune 1000 firms and S&P 1500, respectively.
Consequently, these contextual differences may attest to different risk preferences amongst family
firms worldwide.

DISCUSSION
Areas for Future Research
Thus far, research covering diversification in the entrepreneurship, family business, finance,
and management literatures has provided deep insights into antecedents, moderators, and outcomes
associated with such strategic decisions. While this work has garnered significant findings and
provided a rich understanding of diversification in family firms, there remains a lack of consistent
results across the fields. Therefore, in the following section I shift my focus to the future research
opportunities for scholars to continue to push the field forward. This discussion for future
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opportunities is not meant to be exhaustive, but instead, to identify the focal gaps in the current
literature that may be most impactful for future research to explore.
As revealed in my review of the diversification literature, “different definitions can lead to
completely different outcomes, although the same sample and research design are used.” (Schmid
et al., 2015: 298) since the level of family involvement in family firms may significantly alter the
goals the family pursues (De Massis et al., 2016; Worek et al., 2018) and the board structures and
ownership composition may interact to influence strategic decision-making (Haleblian et al.,
2009). Therefore, I recommend that future work consider whether different levels as well as the
different types of family involvement influence diversification decisions. Gómez-Mejía et al.
(2010) in their study of international diversification preferences in family firms suggest that the
lack of diversification activity in family firms is attributed to concerns over protecting the
socioemotional endowment of the family and that diversification directly puts SEW at risk. While
I don’t disagree with this argument as SEW has been shown to have an impact on diversification
decisions in numerous studies. However, I would suggest that this broad categorization of SEW is
incomplete in that it does not account for family heterogeneity or rather it does not elude to which
aspect of SEW the family is trying to preserve through this line of decision making (Miller & Le
Breton-Miller, 2014). Whereas some families may choose not to diversify over concerns of family
control, others may limit their diversification due to issues of a co-existing family-firm identity or
transgenerational succession goals. Furthermore, the interaction of generational family
involvement may also shape strategic goals (Gu et al., 2019; Worek et al., 2018). Therefore, I
suggest that future research explore the antecedents of SEW in greater depths, as this may have
implications for diversification strategies.
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Future research should also examine contexts outside of the United States as these
institutional norms or institutional environments may provide different results regarding family
firm diversification. The contradictory findings between Capri et al. (2011) and Bauguess &
Stegemoller (2008) regarding value creation following takeovers may be explained by the
contextual differences from their samples (Capri et al. (2011) use a European sample whereas
Bauguess and Stegemoller (2008) sample publicly traded firms in the U.S.), and further emphasize
the importance of international studies. Further, incorporating cultural distance into family
business literature may be a useful avenue to capture some of these international differences.
Additionally, recent work suggests that legal systems and institutional norms have a large
influence on family firm M&A strategic decisions (Requejo et al., 2018), so I suggest that other
studies explore these influences outside of a Western context.
Recent acquisition literature suggests it is imperative that researchers consider the entire
transaction, whereby both the target and the focal firm are considered simultaneously (Feldman et
al., 2019), as evidence has shown that whether a family firm is the acquirer or divestor has a
varying impact on the shareholder value following the transaction. Therefore, I suggest that future
research continue this line of inquiry and analyze transactions as bilateral (i.e., consider both the
focal firm and the target firm) rather than from a unilateral perspective. Further, I propose that
future work consider the impact family firms may have in post-diversification efforts. For instance,
management literature has found that following an acquisition the target firm top management
teams are often replaced (Krug et al., 2014), but does this materialize when family firms are the
target firm in such a transaction? Additionally, how might the integration of two family firms be
resolved following a M&A?
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From a performance perspective, I suggest future research explore the long-term effects
diversification strategies may have on firm performance. The majority of the studies included in
this review focus on performance from a rather limited view (e.g., cumulative annual return) and
therefore, lack the capacity to predict the long-term performance outcomes of such strategies
(Haleblian et al., 2009; Hussinger & Issah, 2019). As such, I suggest that future scholars consider
other performance metrics (e.g., Tobin’s Q, holding period returns) that capture a broader view of
firm performance over a longer period of time (i.e., 6 months, vs. 18 month returns). As family
owners are focused on the long-term longevity of their family business (Lumpkin, Brigham, &
Moss, 2010; Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011), the performance outcomes following a diversification
event may not be realized using a short-term financial measure.
Lastly, the majority of studies included in my review relied on data from publicly traded
firms and therefore I am not sure to what extent these findings apply to privately held family firms.
Utilizing data sources from private firms may offer additional nuance to the diversification
strategies in family firms and while this data is not always readily available, I challenge scholars
to explore this avenue in future work.
Limitations
The results of this review are directly influenced and potentially limited by my choice of 23
journals included in this study. However, the decision to utilize journals in the management,
entrepreneurship, family business, and finance fields was made following the recommendations of
other similar reviews (e.g., Debicki, Matherne, Kellermanns, & Chrisman, 2009; Haleblian et al.,
2009; Worek, 2017). While there is a potential for other contributions outside of the scope of this
review, I believe that I have accurately illustrated the research surrounding family firm
diversification over the past 20 years. Additionally, the keyword search including both the
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diversification and family keywords may have resulted in some publications being excluded from
my search. While the search was systematic in nature, I realize there may be other analyses
resulting in additional publications.
The organizing framework used to organize and summarize the family firm diversification
over the last 20 years is also not without limitations. This framework is not an exhaustive list of
all antecedents, moderators, or outcomes studied in the literature but rather is meant to serve as a
tool to synthesize the extant work in a concise manner. Future work may seek to consider other
methods to summarize the literature which may add to our knowledge on diversification literature.
Finally, the independent review of relevance and fit for each article in my initial 61 article sample
is not without subjective assessment.
Conclusion
In this analysis, I discuss the diversification strategies in family firms and provide a review
of the literature across a variety of disciplines over the last 20 years. Although each field provides
a unique approach to examining diversification in family firms, the scope of each can be broadly
summarized into an overarching framework (see Figure 3). This review reveals that the depth of
this research stream largely relies on the criteria used to classify family firms from their non-family
counterparts, and the discrepancies across these findings may be in part due to the varying
definitions used in the family business field. I anticipate that diversification strategies in family
firms will continue to be a topic of study for years to come and therefore strongly recommend
family firm scholars continue to identify areas of family heterogeneity that may influence these
strategies.
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Essay 1. Table 1. Final Sample of Publications by Journal (count).

Final Article Source
Academy of Management Journal
Academy of Management Review
Administrative Science Quarterly
Corporate Governance: An International
Review
Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice
Family Business Review
International Small Business Journal
Journal of Banking and Finance
Journal of Business Research
Journal of Business Venturing
Journal of Corporate Finance
Journal of Family Business Management
Journal of Family Business Strategy
Journal of Finance
Journal of Financial Economics
Journal of Management
Journal of Management Studies
Journal of Small Business Management
Management Science
Organization Science
Small Business Economics
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal
Strategic Management Journal

Count
0
0
0
3

total

2
6
0
2
2
0
4
1
8
0
1
3
2
0
0
1
1
0
3
39
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1999

Entrepreneurship
Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice
International Small Business Journal
Journal of Small Business Management
Small Business Economics
Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal
Family Business
Family Business Review
Journal of Family Business Management
Journal of Family Business Strategy
Finance
Journal of Banking and Finance
Journal of Corporate Finance
Journal of Finance
Journal of Financial Economics
Management
Academy of Management Journal
Academy of Management Review
Administrative Science Quarterly
Corporate Governance: An International Review
Journal of Business Research
Journal of Business Venturing
Journal of Management
Journal of Management Studies
Management Science
Organization Science
Strategic Management Journal

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

1

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

1

1

1

1

2
1

1

1

1
1

1

1

2

1
2

1

1
2

1

1

1

1

1

1
1
Total

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

3

3

1
5

2

1

5

1

2

2

3

1
4

1

1

2

3

1
4

Total
3
2
1
14
6
1
8
7
2
4
1
14
3
2
3
2
1
3
39

34

Essay 1. Table 2. Journal Articles Published Each Year.

Essay 1. Table 3. Family Firm Definitions 3.

Authors
Almeida et al. (2011) JFE

Family
Definition
(ownership)
-

Family Definition (other)
controlling shareholder. A family controls a firm if and only if it holds more than T votes in it, directly or indirectly

Basu et al. (2009) JBF

≥5%

the founder or his/her descendants either holds at least a 5% of the firm's outstanding share or actively involved in
the management (or governance) of the firm

Bauguess & Stegemoller (2008)
JCF

≥5%

founder or members of the founding family with Family ownership or involvement as officer or manager

Caprio et al. (2011) JCF

≥20%

founder or a member of the founding family (by blood or marriage) is an officer, director, or blockholder, either
individually or as a group.

Chen et al. (2009) Corporate
Governance

≥20%

-

Chirico et al. (2019) JOM

-

owned and managed by two or more family members. Composite measure of Family Involvement = percentage of
family owners, percentage of family members managing the business, presence of a family CEO, intergenerational
involvement

Chung & Luo (2008) Org Science

-

family control as percentage of board chairs that were family members and chair overlap

De Cesari et al. (2016) JCF

≥25%

-

Defrancq et al. (2016) JFBS

≥5%

at least 2 owners, 2 directors, or 2 managers must be family members

Ducassy & Prevot (2010) JFBS

-

where the founder or a member of his/her family is an officer, director or blockholder, individually or as a group AND
second generation or later

Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo
(2010) FBR

-

family member (or family group) is the largest shareholder

Feldman et al. (2019) SMJ

-

founder or a member of his/her by blood or marriage is an officer, director, or blockholder, either individually or as a
group

Feldman et al. (2016) SMJ

-

founder or a member of his/her by blood or marriage is an officer, director, or blockholder, either individually or as a
group

Gomez-Mejia et al. (2010) JMS

≥10%

at least 2 members on the board were family members

Gomez-Mejia et al. (2018) JOM

≥5%

additionally at least 1 family member serving as executive or board member

Granata & Chirico (2010) FBR

≥51%

at least 2 family managers involved in the business

Gu et al. (2019) JOM

-

family influence as 2 variables; chair overlap and percentage of board chairmen who are family members

Hussinger & Issah (2019) FBR

≥5%

Family firm represented by an ownership threshold of more than 5% OR where a member of the founding family is on
the board of directors. Founder family firms defined if a member of the founding family is present in the firm as CEO,
chairman, chairman emeritus, or member of the board and management

Jain & Shao (2014) FBR

≥50%

ownership threshold OR if two or more family members with combined ownership in excess of 5% are involved in
management or on the board

Jones et al. (2008) ETP

≥10%

two or more directors must have a family relationship

Lien & Li (2013) JBR

-

total shareholdings of individuals who have the same family name as the largest owner

Miller et al. (2010) SMJ

≥5%

multiple members of the same family involved either by ownership or management position

Praet (2013) JFBS

≥10%

-

Requejo et al. (2018) JFBS

≥25%

family involvement composite: family ownership stake exceeds 50% OR if the family is present on the board

Sanchez-Bueno & Usero (2014) JBR
Schmid et al. (2015) Corp
Governance
Shim & Okamuro (2011) JBF
Strike et al. (2015) JMS

-

family = Shares held by family members with no board requirement. Also consider second largest shareholders as
family if they hold more than 5% and at least 1 family members sits on the board

≥25%

family owned = founding family holds ≥25% voting rights. Family managed = founding family active on
management board but holds ≤25% voting rights. Family owned & managed = founding family holds ≥25% voting
rights AND active on management board

≥5%

family or founder must be among the 10 largest shareholders
at least 2 family members are involved as insiders (directors or officers)

Tsai et al. (2009) SBE

5-10%

-

Wang et al. (2016) JFBS

≥20%

ownership threshold OR if a family member is chairman or general manager and hold 10% or more shares

Worek et al. (2018) JFBS

≥10%

two or more members of the family are actively engaged in the company, holding a position in the TMT

Zhou et al. (2011) JCF

-

family must be among the 10 largest shareholders

3
This table excludes articles classified as reviews, meta-analyses, or case studies, as these articles did not include a definition for family firms or
used subjective definitions based on case samples.

35

Essay 1. Figure 1. Overall Trend in Publications from 1999 to 2019.

Essay 1. Figure 2. Publications Charted by Journal Discipline.
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Essay 1. Figure 3. Review Framework.
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INTRODUCTION
Acquisition behavior is an activity that provides means through which a firm can adapt to
the changing environment by acquiring another company (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland,
1991). On a worldwide scale, acquisition activity accounts for trillions of dollars spent between
tens of thousands of firms (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). However extant research has
suggested that family firms often lack the ability to adapt to change (Casson, 1999) and are often
unwilling to work with individuals outside the family due to concerns over authority, power, and
influence (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). As “incorporating new products and entering new
markets may induce important changes in the way the family-owned firm is organized, and this is
likely to engender resistance from family members who may feel their tradional sphere of influence
is being threatened,” (Gómez-Mejía, Makri, & Kintana, 2010; pg. 228).
Family business scholars have recognized that the business family, serving as a dominant
coalition of the firm, display certain strategic behaviors that are focused on the long-term
performance and survivability of the organization (i.e., Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011; Miller, Le
Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2008; Lumpkin, Brigham, & Moss, 2010) and as such, family firms
are generally reluctant to engage in acquisition activity as it poses a threat to the socioemotional
wealth and transgenerational control of the owning family (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester,
2010; Gómez-Mejía, Patel & Zellweger, 2018; Requejo, Reyes-Reina., Sánchez-Bueno, & SuárezGonzález, 2018; Chirico, Gómez-Mejia, Hellerstedt, Withers & Nordqvist, 2019). However, when
family firms do engage in acquisitions, there is evidence that they benefit from greater performance
and valuation compared to non-family firms (Ben-Amar & André, 2006; Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez47

Requejo, 2010; Feldman, Amit, & Villalonga, 2019), prefer related to unrelated acquisitions
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2010), yet overall invest less in acquisition strategies
overall (Caprio, Croci, Del Giudice, 2011; Mickelson & Worley, 2003; Sharma & Manikutty,
2005).
Most analyses in this domain focus on strategic acquisition decision differences between
family and non-family firms (e.g., Steen & Welch, 2006; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010; Miller et al.,
2010), arguing that family firms’ strategic decision making is different than those of non-family
firms due to their concerns of maintaining the firm’s familiness (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003;
Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Hussinger & Issah, 2019), their predisposition to be more risk
averse due to their concentration of wealth in a single firm (Schulze et al., 2003; Zahra, 2005;
Zellweger, 2007), as well as over fears over the implied loss of their socioemotional wealth
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010). As a result, rather than pursing acquisition opportunities, family firms
are more likely to forgo growth opportunities such as acquisitions in order to safeguard the family’s
control and socioemotional wealth (Chirico et al., 2019; Steen & Welch, 2006).
Therefore, the purpose of this analysis is to examine the firm performance of family firms
when they do engage in an acquisition. Specifically, I focus on transactions where the focal
engaging in the acquisition deal is a family firm and the target firm is a non-family firm. Typically
acquisition studies focus on measuring the focal firm’s performance post-acquisition without
regard to the influence of the target firm. But recent work on mergers and acquisitions has
highlighted the importance of simultaneously considering both parties involved in the acquisition,
as both firms have a potential influence on the outcome of the transaction (Haleblain, Devers,
McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009; Feldman et al., 2019). In this spirit, rather than
evaluating family firm outcomes to their non-family counterpart’s performance outcomes, I move
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to evaluate situations in which the two governance forms interact within a single transaction and
to do so, I examine the scenario of family firms acquiring non-family firms.
Through an agency theory and social identity theory lens, I argue that family firms
acquiring non-family firms will benefit from increased post-transaction performance. This
performance benefit is argued to stem from the family’s due diligence pre-acquisition, suggesting
that given the inherent risks associated with acquisitions, family firms are only willing to engage
in such behavior when the performance benefits outweigh any costs associated with non-financial
losses. Next, I argue that the relationship between acquisitions and performance is moderated by
a number of family-specific factors. Thus, in order to capture the unique family influences of
family involvement and family ownership (van Essen, Carney, Gedajlovic, & Heugens 2015), this
analysis also explores the moderating effects of family voting rights, non-family CEOs, family
involvement, as well as the level of ownership held by institutional investors.
This article proceeds as follows, first a review of relevant literature from both agency and
social identity theories as well as the socioemotional wealth perspective is provided. Second, the
hypotheses related to the performance of the family to non-family acquisitions are established
along with four hypotheses for each of the moderating factors. Next, the sample, methodology,
and findings are discussed. Lastly, I conclude with a discussion of the contributions and limitations
along with recommendations for future research.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Family firms are defined as an organization where a family has a majority ownership stake
in the firm and where family members are employed in top management positions (Miller, Le
Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007). The focus in this analysis centers on the strategic
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decisions concerning acquisitions and draws on literature from both agency theory (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989), social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Deephouse &
Jaskiewicz, 2013) as well as the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective (Gómez-Mejía,
Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Berrone, Cruz, & Gómez-Mejía,
2012), because from a family business perspective, strategic decisions (e.g., acquisitions) are not
only based on the family’s desire to maximize not only monetary outcomes, but also noneconomic
outcomes related to their SEW endowment (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014; Gu, Lu, Chung,
2019). Further, engaging in acquisitions weakens the control, familial ties, as well as family
identity that the owning family derives from their business (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018).
The agency theory perspective would suggest that family firms are different than other
forms of businesses (Chrisman, Chua, Kellermanns, & Chang, 2007; Miller & Le Breton-Miller,
2005) due to their ability as owners to monitor the managers involved in the firm. As family
members or descendants of the firm founder typically have a large ownership stake in the firm,
they are often effective monitors (Fama, 1980). These family shareholders have a strong incentive
to closely monitor the managers to ensure that the strategic actions are in the best interest of the
family as well as the firm (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Further, as many family owners are also
often members of management within the family business, a strong alignment of interests exists
between the two and thus leads to overall lower agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
However, more recent work in the family business literature suggests that family firms do not
always benefit from lower agency costs due to a variety of factors such as, altruistic motives
(Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001), conflicts within the family group (Eddleston &
Kellermanns, 2007), or conflicting interests in private wealth (Morck & Yeung, 2003).
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Agency issues occur in organizations when managers engage in actions that are positioned
for their own self-interest rather than engaging in strategic behaviors that are in the best interest of
shareholders (Hoskisson, Hitt, & Hill, 1993). The extent to which principal-agent problems affect
organizations varies largely on the monitoring mechanisms in place (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama
& Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Family firms offer a unique setting in which principalagent conflicts may be reduced or even avoided due to the presence of family shareholders who
may also serve as managers within the same company (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). As a
consequence, the costs of investing resources to monitor and incentive managers is relatively lower
in family firms than in non-family firms (Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Lester, 2011). On the other
hand, managers in non-family firms may not be subject to such strict monitoring, so they may
pursue actions that are positioned for their own self-interest rather than those aimed at maximizing
shareholder value. In order to limit these self-serving behaviors, the cost of monitoring managers
in non-family firms is higher. Therefore, relative to non-family firms, the agency conflicts and
associated agency costs in family firms are likely to manifest in unique ways.
Acquisitions create a unique situation ripe with potential agency conflicts, due to the fact
that the managers may view the acquisition opportunities as a chance for them to better their own
wellbeing at the expense of the firm or the other shareholders (Feldman et al., 2019). This creates
a situation where the interests of the managers and the owners are misaligned. Although engaging
in acquisitions has been shown to be used as a growth mechanism for firms (Kim, Haleblian, &
Finkelstein, 2011), not all firms are able to capture value or quality improvements post-acquisition
given the fact that acquisitions are complex transactions (Capron & Pistre, 2002). In fact, despite
the popularity of acquisitions, management research contends that most acquisitions fail to capture
value (King et al., 2004).
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When compared to non-family firms, family firms are more unwilling to engage in
acquisitions (Miller et al., 2010; Caprio et al., 2011), especially unrelated acquisitions (GómezMejía et al., 2018). Further, even when family firms do engage in acquisitions, they are more
selective (Mickelson & Worley, 2003), focus on strategic fit (Worek, De Massis, Wright, &
Veider, 2018), and have a high concern for their family legacy (Steen & Welch, 2006). The agency
arguments suggest that family firms are less likely to incur agency conflicts associated with
acquisition strategies partly due to the principal-agent overlap but also due to the reluctance of
family firms to engage in acquisitions (Miller et al., 2010). That is, the self-serving performance
benefits are limited in family firms due to the overlap between principals and agents and further,
the general reluctance of acquisitions limits the misalignment of goals within the family. Based on
this behavior and agency theory, some findings in the family firm literature submit that when
family firms do engage in acquisitions, shareholders expect a higher future value associated with
the transaction (Felito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010, Defrancq, Huyghebaert, & Luypaert,
2016; Feldman et al., 2019).
Although the financial outcomes associated with an acquisition transaction are largely
uncertain (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001), what is certain is the family’s SEW loss with the same
transaction (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Gómez-Mejía, Campbell, Martin, Hoskisson, Makri, &
Sirmon, 2014). SEW reflects the owning family’s emotional, social, and affective endowments in
the family business (Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012) and is often reflected in
the risk averse behavior of family firms as they have a desire to protect their SEW by balancing
the potential returns and costs associated with such decisions (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014). These
nonfinancial concerns are relevant concerns for family firms and given the overlap between the
family and the business, these nonfinancial goals are assumed to be a predominant concern
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(Berrone et al., 2012). Therefore, recent work has moved to focus on the heterogeneity of family
firms by considering the simultaneous influence of both financial and SEW considerations on
strategic decision making (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018).
From a SEW perspective, family firms also safeguard their identity as owning families
often see the family business as extension of themselves (Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush,
2013). Broadly, social identity theory suggest that an individual’s role identification is derived
from their role represent and similarly, an organizational identification can develop as an
individual’s cohesion with their organization (Mael & Ashforth, 1992). A threat to the
organization’s image may damage an individual’s connection with the organization (Dutton,
Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994) and may further weaken the degree to which a family employee
associates the family business as a part of their identity. Thus, given the strong overlap between
family members and the family firm, family members may be motivated to actively avoid
situations or strategies (e.g., acquisitions) that pose a threat to the organization’s identity.
Taken together, these literatures suggest that family firms are risk averse concerning
acquisition decisions but given the heterogeneity of strategic making in family firms, this
reluctance may not be uniform across all family firms (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012).
Therefore, in the following sections a variety of moderating variables are discussed in order to
account for this heterogeneity (see Figure 1). First, I hypothesize the impact the type of acquisition
target (i.e., non-family firms) has on family firm performance, using a two-year lead measurement
of performance. Next, the level of family voting rights and level of family involvement (board of
directors and management) are examined. Third, I hypothesize the moderating effect of non-family
CEOs and the impact the level of ownership held by institutional investors has on firm performance
post-acquisition.
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===============================
Insert Essay 2 Figure 1 about here
===============================

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Acquisition to Performance Relationship: The Influence of Nonfamily Targets
In an acquisition process there are two different perspectives that arise, the sell-side and
the buyside. In this analysis the focal firm refers to the family firms that buy or acquire another
firm, and the target firm denotes a non-family firm that will sell or be acquired. As Villalonga &
Amit (2010) argue, the distinction between founding family firms and other family shareholders
is a critical separation in family business research. Specifically, compared to non-founding
shareholders, founding family members display heightened emotional attachment and stronger
commitment to the family firm (Schmid, Ampenberger, Kaserer, & Achleitner, 2015).
Family firms have been characterized as being inflexible, resistant to change, and are more
inclined to limit the growth of the firm due to concerns over control and maintaining the family
wealth (Granata & Chirico, 2010). Extant work emphasizes the notion that family firms “make
strategic choices that will avoid these potential SEW losses even if achieving this objective might
come at the expense of other principals (e.g., institutional investors) who do not share in these
SEW utilities. For the family principals, risk averseness to socioemotional endowment takes
priority over risk averseness to financial losses” Berrone et al. (2012: 260). Acquisition behavior
could very well endanger the social relationships as well as the reputation of the family firm and
are therefore, this behavior is expected to be avoided by family firms (Miller & Le Breton-Miller,
2005). If the goal of the family is to maintain control over the business, diversifying the business
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through acquisitions may not be a suitable decision as it would dilute the equity and control held
by the family (Ward, 1997). Moreover, acquiring other businesses may threaten the identify of the
family members as a larger number of non-family members would be integrated into management
or board of directors.
On the other hand, previous research has identified that when family firms do acquire, they
typically enjoy higher post-acquisition performance because their risk averse position precludes
them to only undertake acquisitions in instances where performance benefit or synergies can be
realized (Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; Worek 2017; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018).
Similarly, family firms are more selective than non-family firms when selecting acquisition targets
(Sharma & Manikutty, 2005; Feldman et al., 2019) and are more conscious about the integration
of targets as to not disrupt the current operations or existing firm value (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz,
2013; Worek, 2017). Together, the aforementioned arguments suggest that family firms are more
careful in the acquisitions that they undertake and are expected to acquire firms with good strategic
fit that pose a low risk to the existing firm performance (Zahra, 2005). As a result, the performance
post-acquisition is likely to be greater when family firms acquire a non-family firms (Ben-Amar
& André, 2006; Basu, Dimitrova, & Peglis, 2008; Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; Caprio
et al., 2011). Thus, I formally hypothesize the following relationship between family firm
acquisitions and firm performance:
Hypothesis 1: A family firm acquiring a non-family firm will positively influence postacquisition focal family firm performance.

The performance effects may fluctuate based on family specific characteristics that are
present in family firms (Krug, Wright, & Kroll, 2014; Feldman et al., 2019). Therefore, in the
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following sections I propose four characteristics that are likely to influence the acquisition to
performance relationship. While there are a variety of factors that may contribute to the variation
in acquisition to performance relationship, I argue that these four characteristics are relevant to the
present analysis as they are family-specific and therefore may also influence the outcome of
acquisition transactions. These family-specific variables also highlight the heterogeneity of family
firms, suggesting that differences in both the ownership and management structure of the business
are relevant dimensions and are potentially more complex than previous research has assumed.
These predicted moderating effects along with Hypothesis 1 are represented in Figure 1.
Family Involvement in the Focal Firm
Family firm researchers contend that family involvement results in distinctive goals and
performance outcomes (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chrisman et al., 2012). Family firms
and the corresponding family shareholders have been shown to be risk averse as well as favor
undiversified positions and moreover that family firm owners are most concerned with financial
outcomes alone (Morck & Yeung, 2003). As the “nonfinancial aspects of the firm that meet the
family’s affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence and the
perpetuation of the family dynasty” (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007: 106) are considered a more salient
goal for the family than the goal of maximizing financial returns. Despite the preference for
nonfinancial objects, the literature suggest that performance benefits can arise when key executives
are members of the founding family (Mickelson & Worley, 2003).
With the heterogeneity of family firms, the identity overlap between the family and the
firm is expected to vary largely among family firms. As Zellweger et al. (2013) suggest, the
strongest identity overlap between the family and the firm is expected to occur when family
members are involved in the management of the business due to the ability of family members to
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directly influence strategic decisions through their active participation. Conversely, the identity
overlap may be weakest when the family just serves as a shareholder of the business (Zellweger et
al., 2013). Therefore, it is expected that the presence of family members in the management of the
firm (i.e., family member serving as CEO), will increase the identity overlap between the owning
family and the firm and would thus lead to a heighted awareness concerning identity preservation.
Further, the heightened concern for noneconomic goals is intensified as multiple
generations join the business whereby, as the number of generations involved in the firm increases,
so does the SEW salience (Chrisman et al., 2012; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014; Schulze &
Kellermanns, 2015). Similarly, the generation of control is an important point of differentiation
within family firms (Miller et al., 2007; Schmid et al., 2015). As Bennedsen and colleagues (2007)
and Miller et al. (2007) argue, founders often display more entrepreneurial behaviors and as such
have a large influence on corporate performance. But maintaining a consistent family identity from
the business is challenged when a firm acquires another organization (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018),
therefore the proclivity of family members to safeguard their identity and SEW endowment
(Chrisman et al., 2012), suggests that family shareholders may be unwilling to endanger these
priorities through acquisitions.
The involvement of family members in the organization is critical for post-acquisition
success as they provide firm specific knowledge as well as a high level of coordination to aid with
integration throughout the takeover (Buchholtz & Ribbens, 1994; Coff, 2004; De Cesari, Gonenc,
& Ozkan, 2016). The integration process following an acquisition is thought to be a complicated
process as it requires the combination of different cultures and strategies (Ellis, Reus, & Lamont,
2009; Lakshman, 2011). Moreover, the turnover of executives may disrupt operations and
negatively influence the performance (Bilgili, Calderon, Allen, & Kedia, 2017). From the family
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firm acquirers’ point of view, retaining family members in top management or board positions
may help to speed up the integration efforts, as these family employees are likely highly committed
to the newly combined organization (Bjursell, 2011; Krug et al., 2014). These family member
executives in the focal firm are often required to maintain employment with the firm given that
they are essential in completing the transaction and ensuring the value is realized and therefore
their employment continuity is often part of the acquisition deal structure (Romano, Tanewski, &
Smyrnios, 2001; Mickelson & Worley, 2003). Therefore, given the unique firm-specific
knowledge as well as the long-term commitment of family executives to the success of the newly
integrated organization, the involvement of family executives should positively influence the firm
performance following an acquisition.
Hypothesis 2: A family firm to non-family firm acquisition will be more positively
associated with firm performance when the level of focal family involvement increases.

Family Voting Rights
Building off the arguments presented in Hypothesis 1, the performance associated with
family to non-family firm acquisitions are influenced by the level of voting rights owned by the
controlling family in the focal firm. Based on the definition of family firms—as an organization
where a family has a majority ownership stake in the firm and where family members are employed
in top management positions (Miller et al., 2007)—a large proportion of family ownership implies
that family members have both the ability and power to influence the strategic decision making of
the firm through their controlling ownership stake as well as their presence on top management
teams or board of directors. As family owners value control, they are often cautious to engage in
strategic decisions (e.g., acquisitions) that may dilute their voting power. The voting rights
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controlled by family members have been argued to be a critical determinant of family influence
(Defrancq et al., 2016) and previous research suggests that as the level of family voting rights
increases, the likelihood of acquisitions decreases (Caprio et al., 2011).
Given that family firms are more selective with their choice of acquisition targets.
especially as ownership levels increase (Praet, 2013; Feldman et al., 2019), higher levels of voting
rights are likely to render acquisitions unlikely. Further, the cost of an acquisition also negatively
influences the likelihood of acquisition, as the larger the price, the more unlikely a family will be
to risk their ownership stake (Caprio et al., 2011). This reluctance to surrender voting rights
extends the argument that family firms will undertake acquisitions only as the potential
performance benefits outweigh the ownership sacrifice. As such, I hypothesize that the level of
family voting rights in the focal family firm will positively influence the acquisition to
performance relationship, such that as voting rights increase as does the performance postacquisition.
Hypothesis 3: A family firm to non-family firm acquisition will be more positively
associated with firm performance as the level of family voting rights in the focal firm
increases.

The Presence of Non-family CEOs in Family Firms
According to agency theory, agency issues arise due to divergent goals between principals
and agents (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Research in this domain suggests that when principals and
agents share family ties, these issues are reduced because the involvement of family members in
both positions can enable the alignment of goals (Chrisman et al., 2007; Fama & Jensen, 1983;
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, because non-family CEOs do not share the family ties with
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the family owners, they are unlikely to share the same goals, thus increasing the opportunity of a
misalignment and increased agency costs. Further, non-family CEOs are positioned to behave
opportunistically and pursue strategies that benefit them at the expense of the business (Chua,
Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Fang, Randolph, Memili, & Chrisman, 2016).
Despite these issues, family firms employ non-family CEOs because these executives can
provide additional knowledge and skills that family members do not possess (Carney, 2005).
Additionally, given that “non-family CEOs are responsible for generating superior business
performance like their peers at other businesses” (Blumentritt, Keyt, & Astrachan, 2007, p. 321),
non-family CEOs positively influence family firm performance (Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta,
2013) as they align with family owners regarding their commitment to the financial success of the
family firm. Accordingly, non-family CEOs typically prioritize the economic firm performance
(Tabor, Chrisman, Madison, & Vardaman, 2018) and are less likely to a strong emotional
attachment to the organization (Berrone, Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010). Because
SEW and nonfinancial goals related to the business are derived from family ownership (GómezMejía et al., 2007), non-family CEOs do not benefit from strategies that contribute to such
objectives. Therefore, SEW concerns are not likely to be a salient consideration in the decisionmaking process so it is expected that non-family CEOs are more likely to tolerate risk taking
behaviors such as acquisitions as this strategic behavior may satisfy their economic concerns
(Haleblian et al., 2009; Huybrechts et al., 2013).
Consequently, the disregard for nonfinancial objectives and heightened risk-taking
willingness of non-family CEOs suggests that unlike family-CEOs, there is no mixed gamble
involving the gains and losses of both the SEW endowment and the financial wealth of the firm
(Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018). Additionally, although acquisitions typically weaken the identity ties

60

of the family with the business (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013; Sharma & Manikutty, 2005) an
acquisition would not pose the same threat to the identity of the non-family CEO because they are
not associated with the owning family. These arguments suggest that acquisitions undertaken by
non-family CEOs may be driven by their personal interests—as CEOs often receive increased
compensation and secured employment as a result (De Cesari et al., 2016)—rather than driven by
the interests of other shareholders. As previous research has concluded, acquisitions destroy
shareholder value (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; King et al., 2004) and as a result I hypothesize
that the presence of non-family CEOs in family firms will negatively influence the acquisition to
performance relationship due to their opportunistic behavior and disregard for non-financial
objectives.
Hypothesis 4: A family firm to non-family firm acquisition will be negatively associated
with firm performance when they are undertaken by focal non-family-CEOs.

The Influence of Institutional Investors
Institutional investors can alter the strategic behavior of firms due to their substantial
ownership stake and often favor risk taking strategies generally in pursuit of growth opportunities
(Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996). The presence of institutional investors is generally
associated with profit maximization because through their ownership they can compel the family
firm to reach the maximum the market can provide. Additionally, extant work suggests that a
positive relation between firm value and institutional ownership exists (Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira,
& Matos, 2011; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Wright et al., 1996). While the voting rights
controlled by family members have been argued to be a critical determinant of family influence
(Defrancq et al., 2016), the role of institutional investors as the (potential) second largest
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shareholders has been demonstrated to have an impact (Sánchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014). This
group of shareholders offers an additional source of monitoring (Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988;
Croci, Gonenc, & Ozkan, 2012), as they interact with the owning family and serve as an effective
monitor for the firm and protect the interest of minority shareholders. The presence of institutional
investors may result in the professionalization of the family firm, pressing them to behave similarly
to their non-family competitors due to the fact that the financial goals of institutional investors are
typically in contrast to the SEW priorities of the owning family (Fernando, Schneible, & Suh,
2014), suggesting that institutional investors may encourage the family firm to engage in
acquisitions. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 5: A family firm to non-family firm acquisition will be more positively
associated with firm performance as the level of institutional investors increases.

METHOD
Sample and Data
I constructed a longitudinal sample which includes publicly traded companies in the United
States listed on the Standard & Poor’s 1500 (S&P 1500). Given the topic of this essay focuses on
acquisitions, data related to each deal was obtained from Thomson Reuter’s SDC Platinum
Mergers and Acquisitions database. The data pertaining to family ownership, family involvement,
family voting rights, and institutional investors was manually collected from proxy statements
(e.g., DEF 14A) filed annually with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The BoardEx
database was used to gather data related to company executives and their biographies. All financial
and market data was collected from Compustat. The initial sample of S&P 1500 firms included a
panel dataset of 22,404 observations across 2,704 firms listed from 2003 to 2017, of which, 532
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were identified as family firms and 2,172 classified as non-family firms. From this sample, roughly
19.6% of firms are classified as founding-family influenced firms, which is consistent with
previous family business studies (Gentry, Dibrell, & Kim, 2016).
Acquisition deals were identified using SDC Platinum by searching for domestic
acquisitions announced between January 1st, 2003 and December 31st, 2017. Several filters were
used during the search, thus the initial sample was limited to include only deals that were classified
as completed and where both the target and the acquiring firm were based in the United States.
This search criteria resulted in an initial sample of 107,582 acquisition transactions in the United
States spanning the years 2003 to 2017. To identify transactions that included firms listed on the
S&P 1500, I used unique firm identifiers (ticker symbol, CUSIP code, and company name) of both
the focal firm and target firm of the acquisition deals in SDC Platinum and matched this
information with the ownership data. Deals included in SDC Platinum that did not match the
ownership data were dropped from the sample. This resulted in a panel dataset with 13,830
acquisitions across 15,424 unique firms (including both acquirers and targets). Next, to identify
which acquisition deals involved family firms (as either the focal firm or as the target firm), I
matched the SDC platinum data with the ownership data that was manually collected from annual
company proxy statements. This resulted in 2,957 transactions involving family firms. More
precisely, deals with family firms as both the acquiring and the target firm represented 10
transactions and deals with a family acquirer and a non-family target accounted for 2,947
transactions. After excluding observations with incomplete data and firms with multiple
acquisitions in one time period (fyear), the final sample consisted of a panel dataset with 996
acquisitions from years 2003 – 2017 across 315 unique firms.
Measures
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Dependent variable. The dependent variable used in this analysis relies on firm
performance. Firm performance was measured through common financial measures (return on
assets and Tobin’s Q) used in family business literature (Graves & Shan, 2014; Holt, Pearson,
Carr, & Barnett, 2017, Hussinger & Issah, 2019). First, return on assets (ROA) is a measure of the
firm’s ability to use its resources effectively. ROA is calculated as a ratio of net income to total
assets in a given year. Given that acquisitions take time and the effects of integration are not often
realized until after the transaction is complete, the ROA measure was computed as t +2, allowing
for a 2-year lead. The choice for a 2-year lead follows prior studies (Hussinger & Issah, 2019) and
was also selected due to data limitations. Second, an alternative measure of firm performance is
Tobin’s Q, which is measured as a ratio between the market value of the firm over the replacement
costs of its assets (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997). Relative to ROA,
Tobin’s Q offers a more long-term performance assessment as it accounts for the future
performance of the firm. Similar to ROA, a 2-year lead was also used for the Tobin’s Q
measurement.
Independent variables. Within the sample of S&P 1500 firms, I identified family firms by
extracting ownership data from annual proxy statements filed with the SEC. Additionally, internet
searches and company websites were used to identify founders, as well as current officers and
directors that were descendants of the founder. Following previous literature, firms were
designated as family controlled if either the founder or a member of his/her family is a blockholder,
officer, or director (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). To indicate the family
firm status, a dummy indicator variable was assigned to the sample, where (1) represented family
firms and (0) represented non-family firms. Next, in line with the theoretical arguments, I am
particularly interested in acquisitions within family firms, it was necessary to identify which family

64

firms within the S&P 1500 sample engaged in at least one acquisition deal a year as the focal firm.
Using the SDC platinum database the variable, acquisition, was captured as a dummy indicator
variable where (1) represented if a firm undertook at least one acquisition in a given year, and zero
(0) if not (Hussinger & Issah, 2019).
Moderating variables. To distinguish the potential influence of family owners in the
family firm (Berrone et al., 2010; Chirico et al., 2019; Chrisman et al., 2012), several moderating
variables were operationalized. First, family involvement is a measure of the involvement of
members of the founding family in the family firm. This variable was identified from proxy
statements and is an aggregate sum of two indicators: the number of family members managing
the business and the number of family members serving on the board of directors (Chrisman &
Patel, 2012). Next, family voting rights was identified through proxy statements and captures the
voting rights held by the family and represents the control the family has over the business. This
variable was calculated as a ratio of the number of shares held by the family relative to the total
shares outstanding. The number of shares held by the family includes all classes of shares in which
the family has control or voting power (i.e., family represented trusts) (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
Third, the moderating effect of non-family CEO was measured as an indicator variable with a one
(1) indicating that the presence of a CEO that is not a member of the founding family, and a zero
(0) if the CEO position is held by the founder or a member of the founding family. Lastly,
evaluating firm proxy statements, focal firm institutional investors was calculated as the ratio of
the number of shares held by non-family blockholders relative to the total shares outstanding. Nonfamily blockholders are represented by either individuals or institutional owners holding at least
five percent (5%) of the firm (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
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Control variables. Multiple control variables were included in the analysis to account for
both firm level and family level influences. First, there are firm level financial influences that could
possibility alter the performance of firm’s that undertake acquisitions. Specifically, firm size,
measured as the natural log of total assets, slack resources (absorbed and unabsorbed slack), and
relative indebtedness (debt/equity) were controlled for. The deal value of the transaction was also
included as a control, as it represents the dollar value (in millions) that was paid for each
transaction (Feldman et al., 2019).
Control variables were also used to capture the governance controls and CEO
characteristics. First, to identify the quality and intensity of monitoring, outside directors, was
used to reflect the percentage of outside directors present on the board of directors (Feldman et al.,
2019). Firm age (in years) is indicated by the year the firm was founded (Dehlen, Zellweger,
Kammerlander, & Halter, 2014). Next, to account for CEO characteristics that could influence the
firm performance following an acquisition, CEO gender and CEO age, were included as controls.
Analysis
To identify whether fixed or random effects are appropriate for my model, I ran a Hausman
test in STATA. The null hypothesis for the Hausman test is that the preferred model is random
effects instead of the alternative of fixed effects (Greene, 2003). Because the Hausman test was
not significant (p = 0.3359), random effects will be used in the analysis. Next, to test for random
effects and determine whether a random effects regression or a simple ordinary least squares
regression is more appropriate, I ran the Breusch-Pagen Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. The null
hypothesis for the LM test is that there is no significant difference across units. Because the LM
test was significant (p = 0.0000), there is evidence of significant differences across the panel data
and therefore a random effects regression will be used. To test Hypothesis 1 which predicts that
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family firm acquisitions will be positively associated with firm performance, random effects
regression (xtreg, re) was used in STATA (Feldman et al., 2019). The same method for analysis
was used to test all five hypotheses.

RESULTS
The descriptive statistics and correlations for all the variables used in the model are
provided in Table 1. For the correlations, the intercorrelations ranged from -0.6627 to 0.3094,
suggesting little evidence of multi-collinearity. Further, the variable inflation factors (VIF) of the
variables ranged from 1.76 to 1.02, with an average value of 1.26, and as these were well below
the accepted threshold of 10, suggesting the issue of multicollinearity is limited (Hair, Black,
Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006).
===============================
Insert Essay 2 Table 1 about here
===============================

To limit concerns related to endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias (Antonakis,
Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2014), it was necessary to identify instrumental variables that are
significantly correlated to the independent variables (i.e., acquisition, family voting rights, nonfamily CEO, institutional shareholders, family involvement) but are unrelated to the dependent
variable of interest (i.e., ROA and Tobin’s Q). The instrumental variables used to control for
endogeneity were board of director chair and board of director’s gender. Board of director chair
was operationalized as a dummy variable that equals (1) if the chair is a member of the founding
family, and zero (0) otherwise. The board of director’s gender ratio is a measure of the number of
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men and women on a board of directors in a given year. Based on previous research these two
instrumental variables are expected to be strongly correlated to the family and firm variables in the
model. Indeed, the instrumental variables were significantly related to the independent variables
but were not related to the dependent variables. Next, running the 2-stage least squares analysis
along with the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the results indicate that endogeneity is not a concern, as
I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the variable are exogenous (F(1, 2862) = 0.023457, p =
0.8783). These results indicate that endogeneity has limited effects on the results (Cameron &
Trivedi, 2010).
To analyze the direct effect of the binary independent variable (acquisition) on ROA and
Tobin’s Q, I employed random effects regression. Table 2 presents the full results for the full
sample. Overall, these Models suggest that family firms do not benefit financially from engaging
in acquisitions. The coefficients presented in Model 1 include the control variables and show that
absorbed slack (ß = -1.051; p = 0.001) and CEO age (ß = -0.051; p = 0.007) are both negatively
and significantly related to Tobin’s Q. Model 1 also indicated that the ratio of board of director
outsiders is negatively and marginally significantly related to Tobin’s Q (ß = -3.156; p = 0.088).
With regard to ROA, the results indicate that unabsorbed slack exerts a negative but weakly
significant effect (ß = -0.025; p = 0.09).
Next, Model 2 includes the control variables in addition to the independent dummy variable
of whether or not the family firm engaged in at least one acquisition in a given year. These results
indicate that an acquisition is negatively related to Tobin’s Q but is not significant (ß = -0.054; p
= 0.914). Alternatively, a family firm acquisition is positively related to ROA but is also not
significant (ß = 0.002; p = 0.924). Model 3 of Table 2 includes the addition of the four moderating
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variables and Model 4 includes the full model with all variables as well as the interaction of the
moderators.
The results in Model 4 suggest that family firms do not realize a financial performance
benefit following an acquisition as measured by ROA nor Tobin’s Q, as neither have a significant
direct effect. More specifically, a family acquisition exerts an insignificant positive influence on
Tobin’s Q (ß = 1.017; p = 0.636) but in contrast, a family firm acquisition has a negative
insignificant effect on ROA (ß = -0.127; p = 0.174). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is not supported.
When considering the influence of the moderating variables Model 4 reveals that the level of focal
family involvement does not result in a significant effect on either ROA (ß = 0.0003; p = 0.985)
nor Tobin’s Q (ß = -0.0415; p = 0.172) and as a result, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Further, the
moderating effect of family voting rights is also not significant. More precisely, family voting
rights has a negative insignificant effect on ROA (ß = -0.064; p = 0.169) but a positive insignificant
effect on Tobin’s Q (ß = 0.234; p = 0.439). These insignificant effects provide conflicting
directionality and therefore, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Model 4 indicates that the presence of
a non-family CEO positively and significantly influences the ROA following an acquisition (ß =
0.089; p = 0.034). This result in is the opposite direction of the hypothesized effect and does not
significantly influence Tobin’s Q (ß = -0.681; p = 0.405). Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is not supported.
Lastly, the level of institutional investor ownership has a significant and positive influence on
ROA (ß = 0.342; p = 0.03) but also has a positive but insignificant effect on Tobin’s Q (ß = 2.666;
p = 0.415) two years post-acquisition. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is partially supported.
===============================
Insert Essay 2 Table 2 about here
===============================

69

DISCUSSION
The objective of this study was to investigate the influence of acquisitions on firm
performance in a family firm setting while also considering the effect of several family specific
variables. By integrating agency and social identity theory with the SEW perspective, I
hypothesize how family firms provide the opportunity to realize financial gains from acquisitions
due to the long-term focus and affective endowment attached to the business. Specifically, I
hypothesized that an acquisition would positively influence firm performance (H1), using two
different measures of firm performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA). However, neither two-year lead
measurement of performance provided empirical support for Hypothesis 1. Although neither
measure was significant, the operationalization of firm performance had differing coefficient signs.
A family firm to non-family firm acquisition had a negative effect on firm performance two years
post-transaction when measured as Tobin’s Q but had a positive effect on ROA two years postacquisition. This finding is in contrast to previous work that suggests that compared to non-family
firms, family firms are able to add value via acquisitions (Defrancq et al., 2016; Feito-Ruiz &
Menéndez-Requejo, 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018; Worek 2017). However, this study focuses
exclusively on the heterogeneity of family firms and thus the performance discrepancies may be
due to the sample selection. Recent arguments in the literature consider a mixed gamble
perspective of whether or not the value of SEW or the value financial wealth is more influential in
strategic decision making (Chirico et al., 2019; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2014; Gómez-Mejía et al.,
2018; Hussinger & Issah, 2019). Or rather, that diversification decisions require a trade-off
between financial and nonfinancial goals (Berrone et al., 2012; Swab, Sherlock, Markin, & Dibrell,
2020; Worek, 2017). The arguments and results from this study indicate that acquisitions do not
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necessarily destroy financial wealth, so the simultaneous goals may be achievable for family firms
pursuing diversification.
Additionally, this work contributes to the literature by considering the moderating effects
of family ownership and family involvement variables (Ben-Amar & André, 2006; Feldman et al.,
2019; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018). To account for the positive family influence that family
managers and family officers would exert due to their heightened identity and commitment to the
success of the business, I hypothesized that increased levels of family involvement would
positively moderate the relationship between acquisition and firm performance. The results of the
random effects regression suggest that family involvement positively moderates the relationship
when ROA is the dependent variables but has a negative effect on firm performance when Tobin’s
Q is operationalized for firm performance. However, neither resulted in significant relationship
and therefore, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. These findings suggest that family involvement has
a mixed influence on acquisition performance and mirrors some of the conflicting findings that
exist in the family business literature (Granata & Chirico, 2010; Worek, 2017). On one hand, the
presence of family members in management and on the board of director indicates a long-term
orientation with family members committed to the longevity of the business and thus suggests that
family members are risk averse to diversification strategies such as acquisitions (Steen & Welch,
2006). Conversely, other arguments in the family business literature indicate that family member
executives lack the experience to effectively manage acquisitions and therefore suffer financially.
Therefore, from the inconsistent effect of the family involvement in this study, it is difficult to
discern the actual effect of family involvement.
This essay also extends the work of Feldman and colleagues (2019) to consider additional
family variables that influence the performance following an acquisition. Specifically, the
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arguments related to Hypothesis 3 focused on the moderating influence of family voting rights.
Similar to Hypothesis 2, the family voting rights had both a positive effect (Tobin’s Q) and a
negative effect (ROA) on firm performance. Neither measure of firm performance yielded
significant results and therefore there is no support for Hypothesis 3. Further, Hypothesis 4
considered the moderating effect of non-family CEOs in the focal family firm and argued that this
would be a negative influence. The results of the random effect regression indicate that the
presence of a non-family CEO positively and significantly moderated the relationship between
acquisitions and firm performance when ROA was used. However, the results of this influence are
in the opposite direction of the hypothesis and therefore, Hypothesis 4 is not supported. These
results reveal that the presence of a non-family CEO may be beneficial for family firms engaging
in diversification strategies. Specifically, a non-family CEO may provide outside experience and
additional knowledge related to acquisitions. Further, although there is a risk for increased agency
costs due to the additional monitoring of non-family member executives, it appears that the
performance benefits outweigh these costs.
Overall, this study provides contributions to the literature on family firm strategic
diversification by developing a better understanding of the influence the family ownership, family
involvement, and non-family management have on diversification strategies and financial
performance. Also, by considering agency and social identity theory to account for family
influences such as family voting rights, family involvement, and non-family CEOs. This
theoretical framework and empirical results suggest that family firms undertaking acquisitions do
not benefit financially from this diversification and additionally, neither the level of family voting
rights nor family involvement significantly moderate this relationship. In contrast, the presence of
a non-family CEO in the focal firm exerts a significant and positive influence on the ROA
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following an acquisition and suggests that family firms benefit from employing a non-family
executive. Further, Hypothesis 5, which argued that the acquisition to firm performance
relationship would be positively moderated by institutional investors, was marginally supported.
Specifically, the level of institutional investor ownership had a significant and positive effect on
ROA two year following an acquisition. These findings illustrate that family firms are able to
benefit financially by incorporating non-family management and large non-family blockholders.
Limitations and Future Research
This study is not without limitations. Specifically, the work in this study is limited by the
sample which only included transactions between family and non-family firms. I do not evaluate
the differences between all dyadic relationships that may manifest in an acquisition deal. The
extent to which the family specific characteristics interact between firms in the deal is not captured,
yet considerable differences may exist between deals where a family firm acquires another family
firm versus when a non-family firm acquires another non-family firm. Although considering all
possible ownership combinations is outside the scope of this analysis, future research may wish to
explore the differences in performance from the different pairings. It would also be interesting for
future research to consider how two family dynamics interact within an acquisition transaction and
how family specific goals are balanced. Next, the independent variable measure of family firms is
limited to only those as either family or non-family firms and therefore, does not capture lonefounder firms. As lone-founder firms have been demonstrated to be significantly different from
family and non-family firms (Cannella, Jones, & Withers, 2015), future research may wish to
provide a finer analysis of firm ownership and how performance varies across different ownership
forms following an acquisition. Further, given that the data for this study was collected from the
S&P 1500, the family information pertaining to all firms is incomplete and thus could represent a
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sample selection bias. To mitigate this potential issue, future research should run a Heckman
(1979) selection procedure two step model to identify the inverse mills ratio and include this
information in the statistical equation.
Additionally, this analysis is limited to evaluating the financial performance following an
acquisition but does not capture the interorganizational changes (e.g., change in top management
teams) that may transpire following the deal. As integration following an acquisition is a prominent
topic in the management literature (Birkinshaw, Bresman, & Håkanson, 2000), I suggest that other
research examine the retention of target firms’ executives post-acquisition, since retaining these
key employees may serve as a source of value creation and these effects may be stronger when
executives are members of the owning family targeted firm. For instance, how are family members,
as top management team members, integrated into non-family firms? Or conversely, are family
members not integrated into non-family firms and why? Another limitation is that I use a sample
of S&P 1500 firms. These organizations are large to very large in size and as a consequence, either
possess or have access to the resources necessary for acquisitions. Moreover, these firms are
publicly traded and therefore must answer to shareholders. Thus, the extent to which the findings
of this analysis apply to privately held or small- or medium-sized firms may be limited. Future
research should explore settings as there is a predominance of privately held family businesses
across the world (Fang et al., 2016) and understanding acquisition deals within this context would
be very beneficial both practically and theoretically.
This study focuses on acquisition deals but does not take into account whether the deals
were related or unrelated. As previous research has demonstrated, family firms prefer related
targets (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018; Miller et al., 2010) as related targets more compatible with the
risk propensity and prioritization of noneconomic objectives of family owners. Therefore, future
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work could extend the work in this study to explore how performance outcomes vary when firms
acquire a related or unrelated target. Additionally, the random effect regression model in this essay
does not capture previous performance as a control variable. Previous performance may have a
substantial impact on the strategic decision making of the firm, as the performance either above or
below aspiration levels may alter the risk profile of the family firm (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Patel
& Chrisman, 2014). Related, the SEW perspective was used as a part of the theoretical framework
but the measurements (other than family control) included in the essay do not directly measure
SEW or other nonfinancial goals related to the construct (e.g., identity, binding social ties,
emotional attachment, or succession intentions) (Debicki, Kellermanns, Chrisman, Pearson, &
Spencer, 2016). Future research should consider operationalizing SEW scales (i.e., Hauck, SuesReyes, Beck, Prügl, & Frank, 2016) in additional diversification studies. Lastly, the strategy
literature on acquisitions is rather fragmented due to the lack of precision of what is meant by
acquisition performance. Although the performance variable used in my analysis follows prior
literature (Hussinger & Issah, 2019), other variables are commonly used especially in event studies
such as acquisitions. For instance, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the firm following
the transaction (Haleblian et al., 2009; Feldman et al., 2019) captures performance in a specific
time period. Therefore, to extend this area of research, future work should evaluate performance
as a CAR measure from a longer time frame, as the limited snapshot in this essay may not
adequately observe the unique effect of family firm acquisitions.
Conclusion
By integrating agency theory and social identity theory, this analysis explores the financial
performance following an acquisition. Specifically, by examining acquisitions from a bilateral
perspective, which captures the influence of both the focal firm as well as the target firm, this study
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responds to recent calls of understanding how family specific characteristics may influence firm
performance following an acquisition. As such, my study contributes to the discussion on the
heterogeneous nature of family firms by exploring how four family-specific variables influence
the acquisition to performance relationship. The results suggest that family firms do not add value
through acquisitions, but non-family factors such as non-family CEO and institutional investors
weaken this negative relationship, adding to the value post-acquisition.
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Essay 2. Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations.

Mean

S.D

1

2

3

1 Acquisition Dummy

0.25

0.44

2 Family Involvement

4.00

2.06 -0.0599*

3 Voting Rights

0.18

0.24 -0.0277

0.1967*

4 Nonfamily CEO

0.42

0.49 0.0332*

-0.6627* -0.0985*
-0.0445* -0.0435*

4

5

6

5 Institutional Shareholders

0.23

0.16 -0.0218

6 Tobin′s Q 𝑡+ 2
7 ROA𝑡 +2

3.83

3.51

0.0142

0.0210

0.0081

0.0453*

-0.0919*

0.15

0.48 -0.0099

0.0327

0.0372*

-0.0058

-0.0852*

8 Firm Size

6.52

1.30 0.1159*

-0.1612* -0.1028*

0.1851*

-0.1929* -0.1125*

9 Absorbed Slack

0.22

0.23 -0.0146

-0.0242

10 Unabsorbed Slack

2.37

1.60 -0.0916*

11 Indebtedness

1.33

50.01 -0.0063

74.22 703.20 0.1807*

13 BOD Outside Ratio
14 Firm Age
15 CEO Gender
16 CEO Age
*p <.05

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

-0.0219
0.3094*
0.0524*

0.0077

0.0308

0.0312

0.0265

-0.0719* -0.1084*

0.0622*

0.0183

-0.1262*

0.0434*

-0.0059

-0.0138

-0.0112

0.0065

-0.0070

-0.0194

-0.0107

0.0034

-0.0057

-0.0051

0.0006

0.0174

-0.0286

0.0302

0.0170

0.1219*

-0.0216

-0.0596*

0.0017

-0.0971* -0.0502* -0.0715* -0.0588*

-0.0283

-0.0448*

-0.0213

0.0152

-0.0907* -0.0774* -0.1506*

0.1708*

0.15

0.18

0.0235

0.0300

0.0207

-0.0296

17.58

6.89

0.0137

-0.1355*

0.0803*

0.0841*

0.0938*

0.0167

0.0384

0.0243

-0.0208

-0.1072*

0.0573

0.0418

0.1349*

0.96

0.20 0.0511*

-0.0266

-0.0514*

0.0435

-0.0472*

0.0390

0.0111

0.0967*

-0.0173

-0.0829*

0.0036

0.0139

-0.0810*

-0.0404

55.54

7.73 -0.0196

0.0388

0.0328

-0.0631*

0.0341

-0.0398

-0.0122

-0.0440

-0.0559*

-0.0253

0.0521*

-0.0031 -0.0555*

0.0484
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12 Deal Value ($mil)

7

-0.0003

Essay 2. Table 2. Regression Analysis
M odel 2

M odel 3

M odel 4

ROA𝑡 +2
Tobin′s Q 𝑡+ 2
ROA𝑡 +2
Tobin′s Q 𝑡+ 2
Tobin′s Q 𝑡+ 2
ROA𝑡 +2
ROA𝑡 +2
Tobin′s Q 𝑡+ 2
Dependent Variable
Constant
13.634 (5.153)**
0.318 (0.258)
13.637*** (5.149)
0.318 (0.259)
14.927*** (4.961)
0.447 (0.280)
14.836*** (4.938)
0.486* (0.289)
Independent Variable
Acquisition Dummy
-0.054 (0.500)
0.002 (0.027)
-0.103 (0.511)
0.0004 (0.029)
1.017 (2.151)
-0.127 (0.093)
M oderating Variables
Non-Family CEO
0.531 (0.732)
-0.055 (0.034)
0.685 (0.750)
-0.073** (0.036)
Voting Rights
0.087 (0.128)
0.022 (0.017)
0.065 (0.266)
0.073* (0.040)
Family Involvement
0.083 (0.208)
0.007 (0.010)
0.147 (0.223)
0.005 (0.010)
Institutional Shareholders
-4.872** (2.129)
-0.354** (0.159)
-5.671** (2.559)
-0.444*** (0.174)
Interactions
Acquisition x Non-Family CEO
-0.681 (0.817)
0.089** (0.042)
Acquisition x Voting Rights
0.234 (0.303)
-0.064 (0.046)
Acquisition x Family Involvement
-0.415 (0.303)
0.0003 (0.018)
Acquisition x Institutional Shareholders
2.666 (3.271)
0.342** (0.157)
Controls
Firm Size
-0.832 (0.528)
-0.010 (0.017)
-0.832 (0.523)
-0.010 (0.017)
-0.958* (0.529)
-0.012 (0.016)
-0.980* (0.528)
-0.014 (0.016)
Absorbed Slack
-1.051*** (0.320)
-0.046 (0.029)
-1.055*** (0.320)
-0.045 (0.029)
-0.971** (0.331)
-0.032 (0.025)
-0.974*** (0.332)
-0.027 (0.024)
Unabsorbed Slack
-0.009 (0.182)
-0.025* (0.015)
-0.008 (0.183)
-0.025* (0.015)
-0.036 (0.180)
-0.028* (0.015)
-0.059 (0.176)
-0.030** (0.015)
Indebtedness
0.012 (0.018)
0.0007 (0.0006)
0.012 (0.018)
0.0006 (0.0006)
0.014 (0.018)
0.0009* (0.0005)
0.013 (0.018)
0.0008 (0.0006)
Deal Value ($mil)
-0.0002 (.000)
-0.000007 (0.000009) -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.000007 (0.000009) -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.000006 (0.00001) -0.0002 (0.0002) -0.000008 (0.000008)
BOD Outside Ratio
-3.156* (1.849)
0.106 (0.113)
-3.126* (1.864)
0.107 (0.114)
-3.336** (1.768)
0.088 (0.111)
-3.353** (1.766)
0.098 (0.109)
Firm Age
0.008 (0.058)
-0.001 (0.004)
0.008 (0.059)
-0.001 (0.004)
0.039 (0.060)
0.0006 (0.004)
0.039 (0.059)
0.0005 (0.004)
CEO Gender
-0.362 (0.857)
-0.044 (0.071)
-0.373 (0.854)
-0.044 (0.071)
-0.299 (0.863)
-0.039 (0.063)
-0.188 (0.773)
-0.031 (0.064)
CEO Age
-0.051*** (0.0285)
0.001 (0.002)
-0.050* (0.028)
0.001 (0.002)
-0.056** (0.028)
0.00004 (0.002)
-0.056** (0.028)
-0.000002 (0.002)
*** p <.01; ** p <.05; *p <.10. Two-tailed tests.
Note. Standard errors are reported in parentheses; ROA = return on assets.
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M odel 1

Essay 2. Figure 1. Research Model and Hypotheses.
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INTRODUCTION
Succession is one of the most frequently studied topics in family business research
(Debicki, Matherne, Kellermanns, & Chrisman, 2009; Yu, Lumpkin, Sorenson & Brigham, 2012),
as owning families typically favor passing the business onto the next generation in order to keep
the business in the family (Le Breton-Miller, Miller, & Steier, 2004; Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma,
1999). But when intra-family succession is not an option, selling the family business or transferring
the ownership to outside parties are strong alternatives as these exit routes provide the family the
option to secure firm survival (Scholes, Westhead, Burrows, 2008; Wennberg, Wiklund,
DeTienne, & Cardon, 2010). Despite the various options for ownership exit, there remains a lack
of understanding and empirical evidence surrounding the sources of influence pertaining to family
firm exit strategies outside of succession (DeTienne, 2010; Dehlen, Zellweger, Kammerlander, &
Halter, 2014; Chirico, Gómez-Mejía, Hellerstedt, Withers, & Nordqvist, 2019).
Rather than assuming that ownership exit is an unattractive or last resort option compared
to succession, recent research proposes that external exit routes may serve as optimal strategy.
DeTienne (2010) defines entrepreneurial exit as “the process by which the founders of privately
held firms leave the firm they helped to create; thereby removing themselves, in varying degree,
from the primary ownership and decision-making structure of the firm” (2010: 203). Applying this
definition of the entrepreneur’s decision to leave a firm to the family business context, researchers
have found evidence that different ownership structures have differing exit preferences, such that
family exit preferences differ from those of non-family firms (Chirico et al., 2019). This research
assumes that family firm exit preferences differ based on the socioemotional wealth attachment
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and other nonfinancial concerns the owning family has for their business. To advance this stream
of literature, in this analysis I examine the differences across family firms suggesting that the
family ownership may not exert a homogenous influence on exit routes but rather there may be
considerable nuance in exit routes depending on the levels of family influence. Using a sample of
publicly traded family firms, this analysis specifically examines four particular family variables
(e.g., family voting rights, family involvement, non-family CEO, and institutional investors) which
may alter the preference of exit routes for owning families. Specifically, I look at two different
exit outcomes, gradual exit and outright sale.
As Mickelson and Worley (2003: 252) explain, “complex family dynamics can lead to the
perception that selling the business means selling out the family.” As a result, family firms
represent a unique group of sellers as they are often more committed to the transaction and make
conscious decisions regarding who they will sell their business to (Ahlers, Hack, Madison, Wright,
& Kellermanns, 2017) as they are concerned with not only the financial outcomes associated with
the transaction but place a high value on preserving their noneconomic interests (Zellweger &
Astrachan, 2008). In this sense the business is not only a source of revenue for the family but also
represents the family’s pride and identity (Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 2013) which
makes exiting a particularly challenging endeavor (De Massis, Chua, & Chrisman, 2008).
By blending literature from agency and social identity theories as well as the
socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective, this study examines family ownership exit strategies
by developing hypotheses on two ownership exit routes—outright sale and gradual exits. Using
data from S&P 1500 firms, I argue that a gradual exit may appeal to family owners as the level of
family voting rights increases, whereas an outright sale may portray as a less attractive route when
there are high levels of family involvement. Further, I examine how the presence of a non-family
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CEO and institutional investors may render an outright sale more likely than other ownership exit
choices. This work contributes to the literature by adding to the knowledge on ownership exit
strategies in family firms by considering alternatives to intra-family succession. Specifically, this
analysis contributes by providing an investigation of how ownership exit preferences are
heterogenous based on a variety of family specific factors and I shed light on these differences
amongst external ownership transfer options.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Family firms, defined as an organization where either the founder or a member of his/her
family is a blockholder, officer, or director (Gedajlovic, Carney, Chrisman, & Kellermanns, 2012;
Villalonga & Amit, 2006), account for roughly one third to one half of all firms in the United
States (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Villalonga & Amit, 2009). Given the predominance of family
firms, it is important to understand how the owners of this large segment of firms are able to
successfully exit. Indeed, the current literature surrounding exit research proposes that the transfer
of ownership is an important component of family firms’ strategy (Wennberg, Wiklund,
Hellerstedt, & Nordqvist, 2011). Most research in this area focuses on succession as the main form
of ownership transfer as the continuity of the family firm is often a goal of the owning family
(Chua et al., 1999; Sharma, 2004). However, despite the prevalence of family firms, there is limited
research exploring business exits as an alternative to the traditional succession strategy and there
is lack of understanding of the factors influencing business exit. For instance, continuity may
become an obstacle for family owners who wish to exit the business completely, as exiting is
typically a challenging task particularly when the owners are emotionally attached to the business
(DeMassis et al., 2008; DeTienne & Chirico, 2013).
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Recent research pertaining to exit strategies presents arguments regarding the factors
influencing founder exits and the options available for founders of entrepreneurial ventures
(DeTienne, 2010; Wennberg & DeTienne, 2014). The development of this work in
entrepreneurship research primarily centers the exit of venture founders and has only recently
shifted to consider a broader perspective of founder exit strategies in later generation family firms
(Salvato, Chirico, & Sharma, 2010b). The motivation of this essay is on the latter. Specifically, in
family firms, how do certain family-specific factors influence the exit decision of the owning
family? How does the presence of non-family management and non-family blockholders affect
exit preferences? And lastly, is there an opportunity for owning families to exit that preserves their
embedded identity and affective endowment related to socioemotional wealth? The objective of
this essay is to answer these research questions by empirically testing four hypotheses. The
following section presents literature related to agency theory to understand how family ownership
can alter the exit decisions. Next, social identity theory and the socioemotional wealth literature is
discussed, highlighting how family member identity and nonfinancial objectives can impede exit
strategies.
Agency theory posits that ownership among managers should exert a positive influence on
the organizational functions due to the natural alignment of the owner’s interests and the interest
of managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Research on family firms has built on this perspective,
assuming that family involvement in both ownership and management roles should strengthen the
positive effect and also be more effective in aligning interests between principals and agents due
to the inherent good will among family members (Zellweger & Kammerlander, 2015). Further, the
ownership in family firms is concentrated amongst family owners which produces a concentrated
decision-making structure between family members (Carney, 2005). However, as later generations
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and more family members join the growing family business, the ownership becomes more
dispersed (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003) and thus can lead to inefficient monitoring. As a
result, agency conflicts can manifest in family firms because it can become difficult for family
members to effectively monitor and sanction other family members due to altruistic family ties
(Schulze et al., 2003).
Agency conflicts can also appear in family firms due to the misalignment of goals amongst
family members. These conflicts are unlike traditional principal-agent problems due to the
personal wealth family members have tied to the business and their ability to also extract private
benefits. As a result, such conflicts and concerns over control and ownership may impede the exit
process. Further, agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) assumes that
strategic decisions are made purely from a financial standpoint and therefore suggests that family
firms would pursue the exit route that ensures the largest financial return for the owning family.
However not all decisions are uniform across family firms as the characteristics of the
family, the business, and the dominant coalition lead to variations in the decision making of the
family firm (DeMassis et al., 2008; Chrisman, Chua, Pearson, & Barnett, 2012). Decisions are
most often made in the best interest of the owning family (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; Morck &
Yeung, 2003) but the motivations that underlie these exit decisions (e.g., boredom, no heir,
financial constraints, etc.) may differ (Mickelson & Worley, 2003). From a socioemotional wealth
(SEW) perspective, owner’s preferences are likely to be shaped by noneconomic factors such as
legacy, family prestige, harmony (Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman, & Chua, 2012; Hammond,
Pearson, & Holt, 2016) as the “ownership stake in the firm becomes part of the owner’s legacy
and comes to be seen as sort of heirloom” (Dehlen et al., 2014: 198). For instance, recent work by
Chirico and colleagues (2019) concludes that family firms (when compared to non-family firms)
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are most likely to exit by a merger, followed by dissolution, and lastly, an outright sale is the least
likely to occur. Their arguments posit that mergers are the most favorable exit option as this
alternative keeps the possibility of dynastic succession available whereas the outright sale does not
afford family owners the ability to derive any SEW benefits for future generations.
A great deal of family business literature has provided extensive evidence that when family
firm owners face strategic decisions, safeguarding of SEW is often a strong priority that underlies
their decision making (Berrone, Cruz, & Gómez-Mejía, 2012; Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, NúñezNickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Salvato et al., 2010b). Family sellers are generally
more reluctant than non-family owners to sell their business due to the emotional attachment with
the business (Ahlers et al., 2017; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Salvato, Chirico, & Sharma, 2010a).
As exiting is not just about relinquishing control or ownership, it also has psychological
consequences as well (DeTienne, 2010) with family members often referring to the business as
their “baby” (Sharma & Irving, 2005).
In addition to the SEW literature, researchers have also argued that a favorable reputation
or identity is a relevant noneconomic goal, as owning families often see the family business as
extension of themselves (Zellweger et al., 2013). The theoretical explanation of this particular
noneconomic goal relies on social identity theory. Broadly, social identity theory suggests an
individual’s social identity is not just a personal identity but also includes the identity derived from
group belonging. That is, that an individual’s role identification encompasses their role and
similarly, an organizational identification can develop as an individual’s cohesion with their
organization (Mael & Ashforth, 1992). An individual’s self-classification into certain groups
enables them to view themselves in relation to others and also aids in making sense of their social
environment (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Further, the part of social identity related to group
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belonging requires that individuals be emotionally invested in belonging (Ashforth, Harrison, &
Corley, 2008), which is particularly relevant for family firms as family members often possess an
emotional investment in the business (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013).
The heightened identification family owners have with the family firm also reflects the
value family members associates with the membership. Such affective value developed from
belonging to the family is a core tenet of the SEW perspective (Berrone et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía
et al., 2007; Schulze & Kellermanns, 2015). Consisting of five interrelated dimensions (family
control and influence, identification among family members, binding social ties, emotional
attachment to the business, and the renewal of family bonds through transgenerational control),
initial SEW research developed by Gómez-Mejía and colleagues (2007) argues that family firms
have a long-term perspective and decision-making is a function of both economic and
noneconomic goals. This long-term orientation is also associated with the firm’s tendencies to
forgo short-term financial gains in hopes of obtaining long-term gains (Zellweger, 2007) as well
as favoring an organizational structure that allows the family to retain control instead of a profit
maximizing structure (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007; Wennberg et al., 2011). In this regard, succession
is a principal concern of the family as it allows families to retain control of the business in order
to pass it on to future generations in the family (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; GómezMejía et al., 2007) and would suggest that exiting the business is not preferred as it eliminates the
family’s control. Further, exiting the business may pose a threat or loss of the organization’s image
may damage an individual’s connection with the organization (Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail,
1994) and may further weaken the degree to which a family employee associates the family
business as a part of their identity. Thus, given the strong overlap between family members and
the family firm, family members may be motivated to actively avoid situations or strategies (e.g.,
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exits) that pose a threat to the organizations or individuals identity. Despite these arguments in the
family business literature, there is evidence that family firms do exit (Salvato et al., 2010a; Sharma
& Manikutty, 2005) and therefore the purpose of this essay is to consider the antecedents of such
strategies. Specifically, how do certain family-specific factors influence the exit decision of the
owning family? How does the presence of non-family management and non-family blockholders
affect exit preferences? And lastly, is there an opportunity for owning families to exit that preserves
their embedded identity and affective endowment related to socioemotional wealth?
In order to empirically examine the research questions and theoretical arguments presented
above, this study focuses on two ownership exit routes. The first option, an outright sale, is an
option whereby the family exits whereby dissolving all ownership and management at the time of
sale. Typically, family business literature has assumed that a sale of the business signals a failure
for the family however, more recent work suggests that an outright sale also presents an
opportunity for the family to benefit financially and reward the owners for their hard work
(Mickelson & Worley, 2003; Ahlers et al., 2017). In fact, some family businesses are managed
with the intention of cashing out (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005). By relinquishing control and selling
the ownership rights to an outside party, the family can increase their short-term financial wealth.
Conversely, the alternative exit option is a gradual exit, which represents instances where family
owners gradually sell off large portions of their shares while also remaining in the company in
some capacity (e.g., as CEO, officer, or director). This exit strategy allows family members to
exert their influence in the organization through management roles all the while they slowly exit
the organization by gradually reducing their ownership shares. Taken together, these literatures
suggest that family firms make decisions with their noneconomic goals in mind and thus strategic
decisions concerning ownership transfer are not uniform across all family firms (Chrisman et al.,
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2012). Therefore, in the following section four hypotheses related to family- and firm-specific
variables are discussed in order to account for this heterogeneity.

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The Presence of Non-family CEOs in Family Firms
The appointment of a non-family CEO is a signal that there is no clear apparent heir who
can serve as a suitable leader (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 2003). This outside appointment may
also be the first indication that the owning family is forward looking towards an outright sale to
outsiders (Bjuggren, Wiberg, & Sund, 2008; Wiklund, Nordqvist, Hellerstedt, & Bird, 2013). That
is, that with the appointment of a non-family CEO, family owners are demonstrating a preference
towards the professionalization of the business and have forgone the traditional intra-family
succession route. Further, the deliberate selection of a non-family CEO may allude to decreasing
or weak emotional attachment from the owning family. Because a family member no longer holds
the CEO position, an identity loss for other family blockholders is likely to have occurred at the
time of appointment (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013).
From a social identity theory lens, a non-family CEO does not have the same in-group
identity as a family CEO possesses (Tabor, Chrisman, Madison, & Vardaman, 2018). This is
because such in-group membership rests on the assumption that the individual is a member of the
family (Zellweger et al., 2013). For instance, family firm employees that are not a a part of the
owning family do not benefit from the nonfinancial benefits bestowed to the family nor the job
security that stems from trangenerational control. As a result, the social identity of non-family
CEOs is different than that of family CEOs as family members are more emotionally invested in
the business than non-family members. Therefore, SEW concerns are not likely to be a salient
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consideration in the decision-making process when non-family CEOs are at the helm. Given that
“non-family CEOs are responsible for generating superior business performance like their peers at
other businesses” (Blumentritt, Keyt, & Astrachan, 2007, p. 321), non-family CEOs positively
influence family firm performance (Miller, Minichilli, & Corbetta, 2013) as they align with family
owners regarding their commitment to the success of the family firm. Accordingly, non-family
CEOs typically prioritize the economic firm performance (Tabor et al., 2018) and are less likely
to pursue noneconomic goals pertinent to the family due their lack of a strong emotional
attachment to the organization (Berrone, Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010).
As the CEO and the top management team are critical decision makers in that they can
have a voice in when and to whom the business will transferred to (Dehlen et al., 2014), the
personal objectives of the CEO are likely to influence the exit strategy. The weaker social identity
and economic priorities of the non-family CEO indicate that motivations underlying the exit
strategy are likely different than those of a family CEO. Taken together, these arguments indicate
that the presence of a non-family CEO will likely lead to an outright sale of the family firm as they
may stand to benefit financially from the sale and do not embody the emotional attachment of the
family owners. Further, the noneconomic and identity losses that family members have already
incurred due to the appointment of a non-family CEO suggest that continuity of control is not a
salient goal thus lessening the likelihood of a gradual exit where family members retain their
management roles. Following this line of argument, I posit that the under the presence of nonfamily CEOs in family firms an outright sale is a more likely ownership transfer route than a
gradual exit. This is formally hypothesized below:
Hypothesis 1: Of the two exit routes, the probability of an outright sale is the greatest
when there is a non-family CEO present.
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Family Voting Rights
A large proportion of family ownership implies that family members have both the ability
and the power to influence the strategic decision making of the firm through their controlling
ownership stake as well as through their presence on top management teams or board of directors.
The voting rights controlled by family members have been argued to be a critical determinant of
family influence (Defrancq, Huyghebaert, & Luypaert, 2016). When families hold the most votes,
they also have the most control which allows them to have a large influence on the decision-making
processes (Feldman, Amit, & Villalonga, 2016). Yet when ownership levels are weaker (e.g.,
holding less than 50% of the voting rights) family firms display risk averse behaviors (Caprio,
Croci, & Del Giudice, 2011), which implies that the decisions of ownership transfer alternatives
may be made due to fears over diluted control.
Given this hesitancy to let go of their business, I argue that family owners with large
amounts of voting rights are more likely to prefer gradual exits as this exit strategy may preserve
some of the control for the owners. Pursuing a gradual exit route may provide the owners the
ability to maintain their socioemotional wealth endowment attached to the business, whereas an
outright sale may render all socioemotional wealth lost for the owning family (Chirico et al., 2019).
Over time, the identity of the owning family becomes increasingly intertwined with that of the
business and thus family owners may be reluctant to sell the business to an outsider (Salvato et al.,
2010b; Berrone et al., 2010; Dehlen et al., 2014)
Additionally, other family business research has found that due to the emotional value that
family members attach to the firm, they often overprice their business in the market (Zellweger et
al., 2012) suggesting that bidders may have to pay a ‘family premium’ to compensate the family
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for the control that they are giving up. However other work provides evidence that despite this
tendency for family firms to overvalue their business, most bidders view family firms as
unprofessional which ultimately negatively impacts their valuation (Granata & Chirico, 2010) and
thus are often sold at a discount in the market (Salvato et al., 2010b; Ahlers, Hack, & Kellermanns,
2014). This reluctance to surrender voting rights and emotionally charged overvaluation extends
the argument that family firms are unlikely to disband or seek an outright sale for a short-term
financial gain. As such, I hypothesize that higher levels of family voting rights in the focal firm
will increase the likelihood of a gradual exit.
Hypothesis 2: Of the two exit routes, the probability of a gradual exit is the greatest when
the level of family voting rights increases.

Family Involvement
Family firm researchers contend that family involvement results in distinctive goals and
performance outcomes (Chrisman, Chua, & Sharma, 2005; Chrisman et al., 2012). Family firms
and the corresponding family shareholders have been shown to be risk averse as well as favor
undiversified positions and moreover that family firm owners are most concerned with
nonfinancial outcomes alone (Morck & Yeung, 2003). As the “nonfinancial aspects of the firm
that meet the family’s affective needs, such as identity, the ability to exercise family influence and
the perpetuation of the family dynasty” (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007: 106) are considered a more
salient goal for the family than the goal of maximizing financial returns. Further, the heightened
concern for noneconomic goals is intensified as multiple generations join the business whereby,
as the number of generations involved in the firm increases, as does the SEW salience (Chrisman
et al., 2012; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014; Schulze & Kellermanns, 2015). Similarly, the

99

generation of control is an important point of differentiation within family firms (Miller, Le
Breton-Miller, Lester, & Cannella, 2007; Schmid, Ampenberger, Kaserer, & Achleitner, 2015) as
greater generational control suggests that family firms will not relinquish their position through a
takeover due to their long-term orientation (Caprio et al., 2011).
Additionally, the identity overlap between the family and the firm is expected to vary largely
among family firms. As Zellweger et al. (2013) suggest, the strongest identity overlap between the
family and the firm is expected to occur when family members are involved in the management of
the business due to the ability of family members to directly influence strategic decisions through
their active participation. Conversely, the identity overlap may be weakest when the family just
serves as a shareholder of the business (Zellweger et al., 2013). Therefore, it is expected that the
presence of multiple family members in the management of the firm will increase the identity
overlap between the owning family and the firm and would thus lead to a heightened awareness
concerning identity preservation.
Yet maintaining a consistent family identity from the business is challenged when the business
in no longer in the hands of the family (Gómez-Mejía, Patel, & Zellweger, 2018), therefore the
proclivity of family members to safeguard their identity and SEW endowment suggests that family
owners may avoid an outright sale strategy as this would deplete their affective SEW endowment.
On the other hand, a gradual exit alternative may afford the owning family to maintain active in
the company via a board of directors role while simultaneously transferring the ownership to an
outside party. A gradual exit may extend the exit horizon, such that family owners can preserve
their identity through employment in the business while quietly exiting as an owner. For family
members, this extended exit period has the potential to satisfy both economic and noneconomic
priorities and thus would appear to be a more satisfactory exit route. Also, due to the fact that
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family owners are unlikely to sell their ownership stakes, especially when family members are
involved in management (Caprio et al., 2011), I expect that as the level of family involvement
increases so will the tendency for family members to pursue the gradual exit alternative, which is
reflected in the in the hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 3: Of the two exits routes, the probability of a gradual exit is the greatest when
the family involvement increases.

The Influence of Institutional Investors
Institutional investors can alter the strategic behavior of firms due to their substantial
ownership stake and often favor risk taking strategies generally in pursuit of growth opportunities
(Wright, Ferris, Sarin, & Awasthi, 1996). The presence of institutional investors is generally
associated with profit maximization because through their ownership they can compel the family
firm to reach the maximum the market can provide. While the voting rights controlled by family
members have been argued to be a critical determinant of family influence (Defrancq et al., 2016),
the role of institutional investors as (potential) second largest shareholders has been demonstrated
to have an impact (Sánchez-Bueno & Usero, 2014).
The presence of institutional investors may result in the professionalization of the family firm,
pressing them to behave similarly to their non-family competitors due to the fact that the financial
goals of institutional investors are typically in contrast to the SEW priorities of the owning family
(Fernando, Schneible, & Suh, 2014), suggesting that institutional investors may encourage the
family firm to exit via an outright sale as it would provide an influx of short-term capital. Similarly,
Wright et al. (1996) suggest that intuitional investors are more interested in maximizing firm value
and therefore pursue growth maximizing strategies and therefore we would expect that they would
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be more interested in the exit strategy that results in the highest value. Given that this group of
owners are not considered about noneconomic outcomes like their family owners, I hypothesize
that they would value the outright sale of the firm and therefore, I hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4: Of the two exit routes, the probability of an outright sale is the greatest
when the level of ownership held by institutional investors increases.

METHOD
Sample and Data
To test the hypotheses in this analysis, I use a sample of large publicly traded companies
based in the United States that are listed on the Standard & Poor’s 1500 (S&P 1500). Firms within
this sample either transferred ownership to one or several individuals or exited through a gradual
exit between 2003 and 2017. To create this longitudinal sample, data pertaining to family
ownership, family involvement, family voting rights, and institutional investors was manually
collected from proxy statements (e.g., DEF 14A) filed annually with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The BoardEx database and proxy statements were used to gather data related
to company executives and their biographies. All financial and market data was collected from
Compustat. The initial sample of S&P 1500 firms included a panel dataset of 22,404 observations
across 2,704 firms listed from 2003 to 2017, of which, 532 were identified as family firms and
2,172 classified as non-family firms. After cleaning the data and removing missing observations,
the final sample for this essay included 5,973 observations across 532 family firms.
Exits via an outright sale represent transactions where the family firm was bought by
another organization, yet the business continues in operation under different ownership and
management (Chirico et al., 2019). With an outright sale, all family involvement and family
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ownership were eliminated once the transaction was complete. An initial search in SDC Platinum
for all mergers, acquisitions, and leveraged buyouts that occurred between 2003 and 2017 resulted
in 16,074 transactions. This initial sample included buyers that were located inside and outside of
the United States but was limited to only include target firms that were based in the United States.
After removing transactions that did not involve a target firm that was both listed on the S&P 1500
and that was classified as a family firm (n= 15,930), the final sample contained 144 outright sale
transactions. The alternative exit route, gradual exit, was identified through a variety of data
sources (proxy statements, SEC filings, company websites, and BoardEx) and the final sample
included 258 observations.
Measures
Dependent variable. The dependent variable in this analysis, exit mode, is represented by
two different exit choices that family firms and their owners may have. The two exit choices are,
1) outright sale, in which the business continues in operation but is operates under different
ownership and management (Chirico et al., 2019), and 2) gradual exit, whereby the family
members exit through a partial sale of their voting rights but remain on the board of directors or
as an executive (e.g., CEO, TMT) in the organization. Using data filed with the SEC, gradual exits
represent instances when owners sell a portion of their shares, which is reported through schedules
13D and 13G. The dependent variable contains a (1) for the selected exit route of outright sales,
or a (2) for exit routes via gradual exits, and (0) for non-selected alternatives.
Independent variables. Following the suggestions and applications of previous literature
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), family firms are
defined as an organization where either the founder or a member of his/her family is a blockholder,
officer, or director. To identify firms that are family controlled, I extracted ownership data from
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annual proxy statements (e.g., DEF 14a) filed with the SEC. Additionally, internet searches and
company websites were used to identify founders, as well as current officers and directors that
were descendants of the founder. To indicate the family firm status, a dummy indicator variable
was assigned to the sample, where (1) represented family firms and (0) represented non-family
firms.
To distinguish the potential influence of family owners (Berrone et al., 2010; Chirico et al.,
2019; Chrisman et al., 2012) on the exit strategy undertaken by family firms, a number of variables
were operationalized. First, to capture the influence of the top executive in the family firm, nonfamily CEO was gathered using details from company proxy statements, the BoardEx database,
and information extracted from company websites. This variable was measured as indicator
variable with a one (1) indicating that the presence of a CEO that is not a member of the founding
family, and a zero (0) if the CEO was a family member (Feldman et al., 2016). Second, family
voting rights were identified through proxy statements and captures the voting rights held by the
family, demonstrating their ability (or inability) to influence the strategic decision making. Family
voting rights is calculated as a ratio of the number of shares held by the family relative to the total
shares outstanding. The number of shares held by the family includes all classes of shares in which
the family has control or voting power (i.e., family represented trusts) (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
The involvement of family members (family involvement) in the firm was identified in
annual proxy statements using the aggregate of two indicators: (1) the number of family members
managing the business and (2) the number of family members on the board of directors (Chirico
et al., 2019). By evaluating firm proxy statements, institutional investors in the business was
calculated as the ratio of the number of shares held by non-family blockholders relative to the total
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shares outstanding. Non-family blockholders are represented by either individuals or institutional
owners holding at least five percent (5%) of the firm (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
Control variables. Multiple control variables were included in the analysis to account for
both firm level and family level influences. First, calculated as the natural log of total assets, firm
size, was also included as a control variable. Next, founder involvement was calculated using a
dummy variable (e.g.,1/0) of whether the founder is still involved in any organizational activity,
such as, serving on the board of directors, owner, manager, or as an employee (Kellermanns,
Eddleston, Barnett, & Pearson, 2008; Morck & Yeung, 2003). Additionally, a number of firm level
characteristics were used as controls to account for financial performance which may render one
exit choice more desirable than another. This includes the market-to-book ratio, which is indicative
of the investor’s expectations of a firm’s growth prospects; the firm profitability, (EBITDA/sales);
the relative indebtedness of the firm (debt/equity); firm performance (Tobin’s Q); and the slack
resources (absorbed slack and unabsorbed slack). To control for the governance of the firm, the
number of outside directors, calculated as the proportion of independent directors serving on the
board of directors, was utilized as a control.
Analysis
Due to the categorical nature of the dependent variable in this study, multinomial logit
regression (mlogit) was utilized to test the likelihood of the two family firm ownership exit routes
(e.g., gradual exit or outright sale) against the baseline of no exit (Dehlen et al., 2014; Hoetker,
2007).

RESULTS
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The correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for all variables utilized in the analysis is
reported in Table 1. The variance inflation factors of the variables in the model were examined
and ranged in value from 1.03 to 3.07, with an average of 1.57. Thus, the VIF is below the
established threshold of 10 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006) and indicates that
multicollinearity was not a concern in this analysis.
===============================
Insert Essay 3 Table 1 about here
===============================

To limit concerns related to endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias (Antonakis,
Bendahan, Jacquart, & Lalive, 2014), it was necessary to identify instrumental variables that are
significantly correlated to the independent variables (i.e., family voting rights, non-family CEO,
institutional shareholders, family involvement) but are unrelated to the dependent variable of
interest (i.e., exit mode). The instrumental variables used to control for endogeneity were firm age
and return on assets (ROA). Firm age is indicated by the year the firm was founded. ROA is a
measure of the firm’s ability to use its resources effectively and is calculated as a ratio of net
income to total assets in a given year. Based on previous research (e.g., Dehlen et al., 2014;
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018; Hussinger & Issah, 2019) these two instrumental variables are expected
to be strongly correlated to the family and firm variables in the model. Indeed, the instrumental
variables were significantly related to the independent variables but were not related to the exit
mode dependent variable. Next, running the 2-stage least squares analysis along with the DurbinWu-Hausman test, the results indicate that endogeneity is not a concern, as I cannot reject the null
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hypothesis that the variable are exogenous (F(1, 796) = 1.21858, p = 0.2700). These results
indicate that endogeneity has limited effects on the results (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010).
The results of the direct effects of the independent variables on the multiple binary outcome
variables are presented in Table 2 (gradual exit) and Table 3 (outright sale). Referring to Table 2
and Table 3, which test the occurrence of a gradual exit (1) as opposed to no exit (0) and the
occurrence of an outright sale exit route (2) as opposed to no exit (0); Model 1 includes only the
control variables and Model 2 includes the controls as well as the independent variables. The Chisquared value in Model 2 (179.59) for both gradual exits and outright sales is greater than the value
in Model 1, and the AIC value (3589.871) in Model 2 is smaller than Model 1, indicating that
Model 2 is the best fitting model (Hoetker, 2007).
The coefficients included in Model 1 and Model 2 indicate the effect of the variables on
the logarithmic odds ratios (Hoetker, 2007) of gradual exits (Table 2) and outright sale exits (Table
3) versus no exit. Model 1 indicates the logarithmic odds that a family firm will exit via gradual
sale is negatively and significantly related to the size of the firm (β = -0.3141298; p = 0.001). In
contrast, the involvement of the founder in the firm (β = 0.3447052; p = 0.002) and the presence
of outsiders on the board of directors (β = 1.033358; p = 0.001) both exert a positive and significant
effect on the odds that the family will exit gradually from the business. Whereas, both indebtedness
(β = -0.0015324; p = 0.063) and Tobin’s Q (β = -0.032562; p = 0.034) exert a negative influence
on the likelihood of a gradual exit. Overall, the results of Model 1, which included only the control
variables of the analysis yielded a chi-squared value of 119.720.
In Model 2 of Table 2, the independent variables—family voting rights, non-family CEO,
institutional shareholders, and family involvement—were added to the equation. The presence of
a non-family CEO had a significant negative influence on the likelihood of gradual exit (β = -
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0.2978222; p = 0.035). The level of family involvement present in the family firm affected the
logarithmic odds of a gradual exit negatively and significantly (β = -0.0676721; p = 0.029).
Therefore, although family involvement significantly predicts the odds of a gradual exit, the
coefficient is in the opposite direction of the hypothesized effect and therefore, Hypothesis 3 is not
supported. Additionally, Model 2 Table 2 indicates that the control held by institutional investors
had a positive and significant influence on gradual exits (β = 1.363771; p = 0.001) and the level of
voting rights had a negative impact on the likelihood of gradual exit but did not yield a significant
result. Therefore Hypothesis 2, which argues that the probability of a gradual exit is the greatest
when the level of family voting rights increases, is not supported.
To analyze the results pertaining to outright sales (see Table 3) the coefficients in Models
1 and 2 represent the influence of the variables on the logarithmic odds ratio of outright sale exits
in contrast to not exiting the business. Model 1 reveals that the logarithmic odds that a family will
exit via an outright sale is negatively and significantly related to the level of unabsorbed slack the
business possesses (β = -0.1116497; p = 0.048). Overall, Model 1 containing on the control
variables in the equation yielded a chi-squared value of 119.720.
In Model 2 of Table 3, the independent variables—family voting rights, non-family CEO,
institutional shareholders, and family involvement—were added to the equation. Model 2 reveals
that the logarithmic odds that a family will exit via an outright sale is negatively and significantly
related to the size of the firm (β = -0.1859061; p = 0.007). Whereas the level of indebtedness exerts
a negative and marginally significant effect (β = -0.160819; p = 0.063). Furthermore, there is a
marginally significant positive effect of the market-to-book ratio (β = 0.000022; p = 0.091) on the
odds a family will exit via a sale route.
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Regarding the impact of the independent variables in Model 2, the presence of a non-family
CEO affected the logarithmic odds of an outright sale exit positively and significantly (β =
0.6021467; p = 0.005). Therefore Hypothesis 1, which argues that the probability of an outright
sale is greatest when a non-family CEO is present in the family firm, is supported. In contrast, the
level of family involvement in the family business had a negative and marginally significant
influence on likelihood of an outright sale exit (β = -0.0890401; p = 0.082). The level of family
voting rights had a negative impact on the likelihood of outright sale but did not yield a significant
result (β = -0.8880921; p = 0.190). Contrary to Hypothesis 4, the level of institutional ownership
present in the family firm exerted a negative influence on the logarithmic odds of the family firm
exiting via an outright sale and was not statistically significant (β = -0.1681748; p = 0.769), thus
Hypothesis 4 is not supported.
===============================
Insert Essay 3 Table 2 about here
===============================
===============================
Insert Essay 3 Table 3 about here
===============================

Robustness Check
To ensure the robustness of the findings in this analysis, I employed additional definitions
of family firms (minimal level of ownership threshold) and compared the results against the
original findings. This test was conducted because no consistent definition of what constitutes a
family firm exists in the literature (Gedajlovic et al., 2012). To conduct the robustness test, I ran a
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multinomial logistic regression using two different levels of family ownership of common stock
(5% and 10% thresholds). The majority of the results held across the previous results, indicating
that the findings are robust across different family ownership levels. However, at the 5%
ownership threshold, the presence of a non-family CEO was no longer a significant predictor of
outright sale. And at the 10% threshold, the level of family involvement was no longer significant
for either exit choice. Interestingly, the results pertaining to family voting rights that were not
supported in the original findings, became significant using the other ownership thresholds. For
both gradual exits and outright sales, the level of family voting rights negatively and significant
influenced the exit choice. This finding may be attributed to the fact that as the ownership threshold
increases, so does the overall voting rights held by the family, and therefore their willingness to
exit decreases. Future research should test this observation in greater detail.

DISCUSSION
The objective of this study was to empirically investigate family specific influences as
predictors of two alternative exit routes: gradual exits and outright sales. I hypothesized and
empirically demonstrated that family-specific antecedents affect the exit route of family owners
from the family firm. Topics regrading family member exit strategies in the family business
literature stress the importance of succession or exit events, as they signal an important shift in the
trajectory of the family business (Sharma, 2004). Recent research in this area emphasizes the
option of internal (Dehlen et al., 2014) and external succession (Wennberg et al., 2011; Zellweger,
Richards, Sieger, & Patel, 2016) or the preference of sale, dissolutions, mergers, and acquisitions
(Chirico et al., 2019), as the primary forms of ownership transfer. To extend this stream of work,
my analysis focuses on the option of gradual exits as an alternative to outright sales and identifies
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four different family- and firm-specific variables that may influence the exit choice. The results
support the notion that the presence of a non-family CEO, the level of family involvement, and the
percent of voting rights held by institutional investors strongly influence the exit routes of publicly
traded family firms. Whereas the level of voting rights held by the owning family did not yield a
significant influence on the family’s exit preference.
In this paper, I draw from agency and social identity theory as well as the SEW literature
to argue that the ownership and management composition of family firms affects the exit strategy
of family owners. I argue that the SEW and social identity concerns of family members may
position one exit strategy as more favorable than the other. The results of the multinomial logit
model provide support for Hypothesis 1. This suggests that the presence of a non-family CEO in
the family firm would increase the probability that the owning family would prefer the outright
sale exit option. Indeed, the results also highlight the negative effect that non-family CEOs have
on gradual exits. In line with agency arguments, support for Hypothesis 1 indicates an outright sale
may be highly desirable for a family exit as it offers the opportunity to maximize short-term
financial wealth for the owning family as well as the CEO. These results also support the agency
arguments that non-family managers may behave in self-serving manner at the expense of the goals
of the family principals (Chua et al., 2003). Further, the transfer of management to a non-family
member that precedes an exit decision, could signal the professionalization of the family business
and thus reduces the likelihood that identity preservation and SEW may impact exit decisions. In
this sense, the prevalence of non-family managers may alter strategic decision making to mirror
that of non-family firms, where economic goals are of higher value.
Related to Hypothesis 4, which argues that the probability of an outright sale is greatest
when the level of ownership held by institutional investors increases, the empirical results do not
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lend support for this argument. Instead, the results provide significant support for the alternative
exit route. That is, that the level of ownership held by institutional investors significantly and
positively predicts a gradual exit. These results suggest that as the level of ownership held by large
non-family blockholders increases, family owners may slowly lessen their ownership shares and
thus the ownership structure may gradually mirror that of other publicly traded non-family
businesses. Therefore, family owners are likely to gradually exit the business while maintaining
their management roles. The results for Hypothesis 4 suggest that with an influx of institutional
owners there may be external pressures that influence the family’s exit decision.
The empirical results from the multinominal logit regression do not support Hypothesis 2,
which predicted that of the two exits, the probability of a gradual exit is the greasiest when the
level of family voting rights increases. The influence of family voting rights was not significant
on either exit route and therefore suggests that family voting rights is not a significant predictor of
exit strategies in family firms. Alternatively, the non-significance of these findings may suggest
that high levels of family voting rights preclude family owners from exiting the business and
instead family members prefer to remain owners. This finding aligns with the arguments presented
by Chirico and colleagues (2019), who present a ranking of exit preferences among family owners
and find that family owners favor mergers relative to other exit alternatives (e.g., dissolution, sale,
and acquisition). This finding is attributed to the fact that mergers allow family members to salvage
both ownership and control by simply merging with another organization, rather than exiting the
business by reducing ownership.
In a similar vein, the results of the multinominal logit regression also do not support
Hypothesis 3, which argued that of the two exit routes, the probability of a gradual exit is greatest
when the level of family involvement increases. The results for Hypothesis 3 are significant but in
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the opposite direction, indicating that family involvement actually experts a negative influence on
the probability of a gradual exit strategy. Interestingly, family involvement is also negatively
related to the likelihood of an outright sale (marginally significant at the p <.10 level). These
findings indicate that family involvement limits the likelihood that owning family will exit their
business at all and instead may indicate that family owners retain ownership and management
through intra-family succession. The lack of support for the family voting rights (H2) and family
involvement (H3) arguments aligns with the majority of family firm literature which suggests that
intra-family succession is the predominant form of ‘exit’ (Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Scholes et al.,
2008; Sharma, 2004; Wiklund et al., 2013) where family owners often transfer ownership between
other family members (Chirico et al., 2019; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018; Wennberg et al., 2011;
Zellweger et al., 2012). This transfer between family members, or traditional succession routes,
fits the long-term continuity and transgenerational aspiration arguments that often accompany
family business research. Alternatively, the nonsignificant findings related to H2 and H3 may
suggest that family firms are unable to exit their business due to the emotional value that family
members attach to the firm, and as a consequence overprice their business in the market (Zellweger
et al., 2012). This increased pricing may limit the buyers who are willing to buy the business as
research suggests that bidders may have to pay a ‘family premium’ to compensate the family for
the control that they are giving up (Zellweger et al., 2016).
In contrast, other research on exit strategies argues that the assumption of long-term
continuity across all family firms may be oversimplifying the exit preferences of owning families
(DeTienne & Chirico, 2013). That is, that multiple exit strategies exist in addition to intra-family
succession and the lack of research on these alternatives does not fully capture the heterogenous
nature of family firms. Therefore, the findings of this analysis contribute to the literature by
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addressing gradual exits of family owners, which up to this point has received scant attention in
the literature. The hypothesized effects of both management (e.g., Hypotheses 1 and 3) and
ownership variables (e.g., Hypotheses 2 and 4) on exit routes provides a broader investigation into
family specific influences. This study also makes a theoretical contribution by considering social
identity theory to explain the tendency of family firm owners to prefer gradual exit alternatives
that extends the valued identity of family owners by prolonging management roles within the
business. These arguments also contribute to the family business literature by considering the
agency theoretical perspective to hypothesize how non-family CEOs influence the exit strategies
of family firms. The findings provide insight into how non-family mangers may behave in selfserving manner and suggests that heightened monitoring of non-family agents may be warranted
before and throughout the exit process.
Recent arguments regarding the SEW perspective suggests that SEW endowments are
present only while the family is in direct control of the firm (Swab, Sherlock, Markin, & Dibrell,
2020), as both the ‘family control and influence’ and ‘renewal of family bonds through dynastic
succession’ dimensions are considered necessary conditions for SEW to exist in family firms.
However, by engaging in an outright sale exit strategy family firms immediately surrender both
control and succession intentions at the time of sale, thus any SEW or affective endowment related
to the business is also severed at the time of sale (Chirico et al., 2019; Dehlen et al., 2014). In
contrast, the arguments and empirical results of this analysis suggest that the SEW held by family
members may extend beyond their majority ownership of the firm (DeTienne, 2010; DeTienne &
Chirico, 2013). In other words, the gradual exit of the family from the business offers family
members the opportunity to preserve any value related to their affective endowment by retaining
their position on the top management team or on the board of directors even though they gradually
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sell off the majority of their ownership, lessening their control of the business. Therefore, gradual
exits may be highly desirable for family firms as it affords family members the opportunity to
slowly exit the business while extending their affective endowment for a greater period of time,
relative to an outright sale.
Limitations and Future Research
As with other empirical essays, this study has limitations that may be productive areas for
future research. First, given that the data for this study was collected from the S&P 1500, the family
information pertaining to all firms is incomplete and thus could represent a sample selection bias.
To mitigate this potential issue, future research should run a Heckman (1979) selection procedure
two step model to identify the inverse mills ratio and include this information in the multinomial
logit equation. Additionally, the data utilized in this analysis draws exclusively from secondary
sources for large, publicly traded firms. The extent to which the findings of this study is applicable
to small, privately held firms is rather limited. There may be considerable differences in the exit
choices of owners of privately held business or those that are smaller in size and as such, future
research should consider investigating the exit routes in various research settings. For instance, the
family owners of smaller or privately held family firms may transfer ownership via management
buy-outs (MBO) or even management buy-ins (MBI) (Scholes et al., 2008). Some of the ownership
and management predictors of family exit used in this analysis may also signal the
professionalization of privately held family firms which often precede a MBO exit (Howorth,
Wright, Westhead, & Allcock, 2016). Additionally, there may be other firm specific characteristics
leading up to the exit that was not captured in the secondary sources. Relatedly, the data in this
analysis is limited as it only captures only firms in the United States and future research should
explore this topic with a more international sample drawing from multiple countries. It is likely
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that ownership exit preferences are highly idiosyncratic, and thus may depend on the cultural
norms or institutional pressures.
Next, the sample in this essay does not allow me to discern between family firms and lone
founder firms. Previous research has highlighted the unique influence that lone founders have on
strategic decision making (Cannella, Jones, & Withers, 2015; Fang, Kotlar, Memili, Chrisman, &
De Massis, 2016; Miller et al., 2007) and how lone founders are significantly different than family
firms. Therefore, future research may wish to separate lone founder firm exit from family firm
exits as this may provide additional insights into the exit preferences of specific owners. In a
similar vein, future research may wish to consider a moderating or direct effect of founder
involvement on the exit choice alternatives. As identified in from the results of this study (see
Table 2, Model 2), founder involvement, as a control variable, had a positive and significant effect
on the likelihood of a gradual family exit m (β = 0.3194191; p = 0.01). Previous research has
identified that the involvement of founders in the business influences a variety of outcomes (e.g.,
DeTienne & Cardon, 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2018; Miller et al., 2007) and therefore, may also
influence the exit route of the family. As such, more research in this area is encouraged.
Additionally, it may be worthwhile for other scholars to consider the impact that the age
of the business may have on exit preferences. Although the data in this analysis does not capture
details related to the age of the business, other research has frequently used firm age as a proxy for
the socioemotional wealth of the owning family (Dehlen et al., 2014; Swab et al., 2020; Zellweger
et al., 2012). This work suggests dimensions of SEW (the emotional attachment and identification
with the firm) initially increase as the firm ages, but often weaken as the ownership becomes more
dispersed over time. Indeed, the age of the business could directly influence the exit route as
increased longevity may extend the salience of long-term oriented goals (e.g., succession, SEW,
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reputation, etc.) and thus, may render one exit choice more preferable than others. Research
exploring the moderating impact of generational stages of the business would also be a worthwhile
addition to exit research. Future work may wish to incorporate either the number of generations
involved in the business or the current generation stage of the business, as both may directly
influence the exit strategies of the business and may explain alternatives to intra-family succession.
Lastly, this study is limited as it only considers two exit route alternatives; gradual exit and
outright sale but other recent work acknowledges multiple exit choices such as succession,
management buyouts, mergers, and dissolution of the business (Chirico et al., 2019). As many exit
choices are available to family firms, future research should consider a wider analysis that captures
additional options to explain why particular exit routes are more attractive than others to family
owners. Future research should also explore the simultaneous influence of buyers in exit choices.
Recent research in the family business literature highlights that both the acquiring and the target
firm influence a sale (Feldman, Amit, & Villalonga, 2019) therefore who the family is selling their
ownership to may have an impact on the choice of exit for the family (Ahlers et al., 2014;
Wennberg et al., 2011).
Conclusion
This study investigates the determinants of family ownership exit routes in family firms.
The majority of literature on family or entrepreneurial exits focuses on succession as the primary
means of exit or explores alternatives relative to intra-family succession (De Massis et al., 2008;
Gedajlovic et al., 2012; Sharma, 2004) but more recent research has observed that there are
multiple exit paths available for family firms (Chirico et al., 2019). Rather than assuming that
ownership exit is an unattractive or last resort option compared to succession, recent research
proposes that external exit routes may serve as optimal strategy. Therefore, I investigate the factors
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that may influence family business owners’ exit choice between an outright sale or a gradual exit.
Using data from S&P 1500 firms, I argue that a gradual exit may appeal to family owners due to
the emotional attachment the family has to the business, compared to an outright sale of the firm
whereby family members are not able to salvage any socioemotional wealth. The results indicate
that the level of family involvement is negatively related to the likelihood of either exit route,
which emphasizes the notion that increased family management may signal the importance of firm
continuity for future generations. Further, the results reveal how the presence of a non-family CEO
renders an outright sale more likely than other ownership exit choices however, other
professionalization factors such as the ownership held by institutional investors significantly
increases the probability of a gradual exit. This variance in exit preferences sheds new light on
how owning families choose to exit their business.
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Essay 3. Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations.
Mean
0.42
0.18
4.00
0.23
0.35
0.07
6.52
0.44
4.48
0.14
1.33
4.00
0.22
2.37
0.15

S.D.
0.49
0.24
2.06
0.16
0.76
0.25
1.30
0.50
94.27
0.22
50.01
4.02
0.23
1.60
0.18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

-0.0985*
-0.6627*
-0.0219
-0.0596*
0.0982*
0.1851*
-0.1194*
-0.0074
0.0222
-0.0112
0.0235
0.0312
-0.1262*
-0.0502*

0.1967*
-0.0435*
-0.0184
-0.0350*
-0.1028*
-0.1176*
-0.0146
0.0182
-0.0138
-0.0077
0.0308
0.0183
-0.0971*

-0.0445*
0.0344*
-0.0944*
-0.1612*
0.1184*
-0.0077
0.0136
-0.0059
0.0235
-0.0242
0.0622*
0.03

0.0337*
0.0035
-0.1929*
0.0153
0.0007
-0.0853*
0.0065
-0.1283*
0.0265
0.0434*
-0.0715*

-0.0471*
-0.1347*
0.0610*
0.0042
0.0198
0.0009
0.0706*
0.0555*
0.0465*
0.0659*

0.0038
-0.0340*
-0.0038
-0.0164
-0.0051
-0.0248
0.0131
-0.0299
-0.0096

-0.0512*
-0.0036
0.0629*
-0.0107
-0.1626*
-0.1084*
-0.1506*
-0.0448*

-0.0095
-0.0404*
-0.0122
0.0790*
0.1243*
0.1718*
-0.0249

-0.007
0.9767*
0.006
0.0129
-0.0042
0.0178

-0.0071
0.1290*
-0.5199*
-0.0553*
0.0116

11

12

13

14

-0.0035
0.0034 0.0651*
-0.0057 -0.1357* 0.1708*
0.0207 -0.0265 -0.0213 0.0152
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1 Nonfamily CEO
2 Voting Rights
3 Family Involvement
4 Institutional Shareholders
5 Outright Sale
6 Gradual Exit
7 Firm Size
8 Founder Involvement
9 Market-to-book Ratio
10 Profitability
11 Indebtedness
12 Tobins Q
13 Absorbed Slack
14 Unabsorbed Slack
15 BOD Outside Ratio
* p <.05

Essay 3. Table 2. Multinomial Logit Regression for Gradual Exits.

Firm Size
Founder Involvement
Market-to-book Ratio
Profitability
Indebtedness
Tobins Q
Absorbed Slack
Unabsorbed Slack
BOD Outside Ratio
Nonfamily CEO
Voting Rights
Family Involvement
Institutional Shareholders
Constant
Chi2

Prob>Chi2
AIC
Observations
* p < .10
** p < .05
Two-tailed tests.

Table 2. Gradual Exit
Model 1
-0.3141298 **
0.3447052**
0.0000135
0.3925815
-0.0015324 *
0.0325262 **
0.329018
0.0438796
1.033358 **

-0.2464338
119.720
0.00
3637.915
2699
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Model 2
-0.2902416 **
0.3194191 **
0.0000144
0.4961108
-0.0017183 *
0.039825 **
0.3191163
0.0439521
1.072864 **
-0.2978222 **
-0.3036136
-0.0676721 **
1.363771 **
-0.2954219
179.59
0.00
3589.871
2695

Essay 3. Table 3. Multinomial Logit Regression for Outright Sale Exits.

Firm Size
Founder Involvement
Market-to-book Ratio
Profitability
Indebtedness
Tobins Q
Absorbed Slack
Unabsorbed Slack
BOD Outside Ratio
Nonfamily CEO
Voting Rights
Family Involvement
Institutional Shareholders
Constant
Chi2

Prob>Chi2
AIC
Observations
* p < .10
** p < .05
Two-tailed tests.

Table 3. Outright Sale
Model 1
-0.0911822
-0.0599502
0.0000131
-0.3518568
-0.0060925
-0.024373
-0.0132042
-0.1116497 **
0.1364242

-1.367337 **
119.72
0.00
3637.915
2699
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Model 2
-0.1859061 **
0.0226423
0.000022 *
-0.4154154
-0.0160819 *
-0.0324072
-0.1505418
-0.0824119
0.1431124
0.6021467 **
-0.8880921
-0.0890401 *
-0.1681748
-0.5619811
179.59
0.00
3589.871
2695
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